UNDOING TIME: A PROPOSAL FOR COMPENSATION FOR WRONGFUL IMPRISONMENT OF INNOCENT INDIVIDUALS by Faridi, Muhammad U. et al.
Western New England Law Review
Volume 34 34 (2012)
Issue 1 Article 2
6-26-2012







Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.
Recommended Citation
Muhammad U. Faridi, Hillel Hoffman, and Paul A. Montuori, UNDOING TIME: A PROPOSAL FOR COMPENSATION FOR







      05/09/2012   13:22:53
31827-wne_34-1 Sheet No. 5 Side A      05/09/2012   13:22:53
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\34-1\WNE101.txt unknown Seq: 1  9-MAY-12 10:14
WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW
 


















This article focuses on a prevalent shortcoming of our criminal 
justice system: inadequate compensation for innocent individuals 
who were wrongfully imprisoned.  After serving time in prison— 
both before and after conviction—for crimes that they did not com­
mit, these individuals often do not have anywhere to go.2  Friend­
ships and familial relationships have gradually deteriorated, the 
ability to find decent work has been hindered by a criminal record, 
and a chance at having a sustainable livelihood has been lost. 
Twenty-four states, the District of Columbia, and the federal 
government have statutes that provide a mechanism for exonerated 
* Muhammad U. Faridi is affiliated with the New York City Bar Association’s 
Capital Punishment Committee.  Hillel Hoffman and Paul A. Montuori are affiliated 
with the New York City Bar Association’s Corrections and Community Reentry 
Committee. 
1. An earlier version of this article is available on the New York City Bar 
Association’s website as a joint report of the Association’s Capital Punishment and 
Corrections committees. 
2. See Fernanda Santos and Janet Roberts, Putting a Price on a Wrongful Convic­
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2 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1 
individuals to seek compensation.3  Some states have private laws 
that provide compensation on a person-by-person basis, while 
others provide no compensation whatsoever. This article critiques 
the statutory approach taken by those twenty-six jurisdictions and 
proposes a statute that adequately accounts for the need to com­
pensate the innocent while considering the state’s interests. The 
proposed statute reflects the fairest practices at this time.  It is 
likely that any effective exoneration statute will need continual up­
dating to reflect contemporary developments in science and tech­
nology and changes in law.  Drawing upon a mixture of the best 
elements from now-existing laws and certain foundational princi­
ples of justice, the proposed statute is both a functioning piece of 
legislation for current times and a foundation for future 
development. 
Part I of this article provides a background on the realm of 
wrongful convictions and argues for the need to provide compensa­
tion for wrongfully convicted individuals. Then, Part II summarizes 
the shortfalls and successes of various state statutes, while providing 
a discussion of how various elements of the existing statutory 
framework are incorporated into the authors’ proposed statute. 
Part III sets forth the full text of the proposed statute, which, the 
authors advocate, should be considered by those states that have 
yet to adopt a compensation statute or are considering revising 
their current statutes. 
I. WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE NEED TO COMPENSATE 
Fairness and justice are considered the cornerstones of the 
American criminal justice system.  But these concepts primarily de­
fine the system prior to conviction and incarceration.4  The system 
provides specific safeguards for a person accused of a crime: a pro­
hibition against unreasonable searches and seizures,5 an adversarial 
3. See infra Part II. 
4. These concepts have their underpinnings in Blackstone’s thoughtfully calcu­
lated ratio: “[B]etter that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.”  4 
WILLIAM  BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 358 (8th ed., Oxford Clarendon Press 1778); 
see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[I]t is far 
worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.”); VOLTAIRE, ZADIG 
150 (Tobias George Smollett trans., Lester G. Crocker ed., Washington Square Press 3d 
prtg. 1971) (“[I]t is better to run the risk of sparing the guilty than to condemn the 
innocent.”). 
5. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961) (cita­
tion omitted) (quoting Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914)) (internal quo­
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3 2012] A PROPOSAL: COMPENSATION FOR WRONGFUL IMPRISONMENT 
system of justice,6 a presumption of innocence in a criminal pro­
ceeding,7 a right to effective legal counsel,8 a right to a speedy trial,9 
a right to a jury trial,10 and a right to equal protection of the law.11 
Prior to a citizen standing trial as a defendant before a jury, a multi­
tude of events must occur: e.g., the reading of warnings, an explana­
tion of rights, the provision of counsel, and the exclusion of 
unconstitutional evidence.  From these protections, it appears that 
the system is geared towards providing fairness and justice to a per­
son accused of a crime; cases such as Miranda v. Arizona,12 Gideon 
v. Wainwright,13 and Mapp v. Ohio14 symbolize these efforts. 
Yet despite the protections afforded by what appears to be a 
fair and just system,15 innocent people are sometimes sent to prison. 
Eyewitness misidentification, unreliable science, false confessions, 
governmental misconduct, evidence obtained from informants and 
jailhouse snitches, and ineffective assistance of counsel are the lead-
and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 
Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures is 
of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken 
from the Constitution.”). 
6. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974) (“We have elected to 
employ an adversary system of criminal justice in which the parties contest all issues 
before a court of law.  The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is 
both fundamental and comprehensive.  The ends of criminal justice would be defeated 
if judgments were to be founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts.”). 
7. See, e.g., Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) (“The principle that 
there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axio­
matic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration 
of our criminal law.”). 
8. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984). But see Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Drink, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The Constitu­
tional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland Prejudice Require­
ment, 75 NEB. L. REV. 425, 455-60 (1996) (illustrating cases of ineffective assistance of 
counsel where courts have not found the Sixth Amendment to have been violated). 
9. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). 
10. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 
(2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 
466 (2000). 
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555 (1979) 
(“Discrimination on the basis of race, odious in all aspects, is especially pernicious in 
the administration of justice.”). 
12. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that certain warnings must 
be read to a person in custody prior to interrogation). 
13. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that, in accordance with 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, states must provide counsel for an indigent de­
fendant accused of a crime). 
14. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that evidence obtained in viola­
tion of the Fourth Amendment must be excluded). 
15. Needless to say, even this system has many flaws.  But to list them here is 
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4 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1 
ing causes of wrongful convictions.16  Hundreds of individuals have 
been exonerated after being convicted of crimes that they did not 
commit.  Exonerations are on the rise, partly due to recent scientific 
advancements in DNA testing.17  For example, DNA evidence ulti­
mately proved the innocence of Steven Barnes, Timothy Cole, and 
Joseph Fears, Jr., who had served nineteen,18 thirteen,19 and 
twenty-five years in prison,20 respectively.  According to the Inno­
cence Project, there have been 273 exonerations due to DNA evi­
dence, 206 of which have occurred since 2000.21  Even more 
troubling is the fact that seventeen DNA exonerations occurred in 
16. See The Causes of Wrongful Conviction, INNOCENCE  PROJECT, http://www. 
innocenceproject.org/understand/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2012); Editorial, True and Un­
true Confessions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/ 
01/12/opinion/12sat2.html (noting that police interrogations and confessions are a lead­
ing cause for false convictions). 
17. Edward K. Cheng, Reenvisioning Law Through the DNA Lens, 60 N.Y.U. 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 649, 649 (2005) (“In recent times, no development has transformed 
the practice of criminal justice as much as DNA evidence.  In little over fifteen years, 
DNA profiling has produced nothing short of a paradigm shift.”); Samuel R. Gross et 
al., Exonerations in the United States: 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL­
OGY 523, 523 (2005) (referring to the first DNA exonerations as “the beginning of a 
revolution in the American criminal justice system.  Until then, exonerations of falsely 
convicted defendants were seen as aberrational.  Since 1989, these once-rare events 
have become disturbingly commonplace.”). 
18. Rocco LaDuca, It’s Official: Barnes Exonerated on All Charges, UTICA  OB­
SERVER-DISPATCH, Jan. 9, 2009, available at http://www.uticaod.com/news/x497784091/ 
Its-official-Barnes-exonerated-on-all-charges. 
19. Elliott Blackburn, Judge Exonerates Timothy Cole, LUBBOCK AVALANCHE-J., 
Apr. 7, 2009, available at http://lubbockonline.com/stories/040709/loc_426805642.shtml 
(noting that Timothy Cole died in prison on December 2, 1999, almost ten years before 
he was exonerated by DNA evidence). 
20. Geoff Dutton & Mike Wagner, Savoring His First Taste of Freedom, COLUM­
BUS  DISPATCH, Mar. 11, 2009, available at http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/lo­
cal/2009/03/11/FEARS_FREE.ART_ART_03-11-09_A1_G1D6LE7.html. 
21. Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, INNOCENCE  PROJECT, http:// 
www.innocenceproject.org/Content/351.php (last visited Apr. 15, 2012); see also About 
the Organization, INNOCENCE  PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/9. 
php (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).  Further, in March 2011, Houston prosecutors formally 
asked a court to exonerate George Rodriguez after DNA tests ruled out his guilt in a 
rape for which he served 17 years in prison. Man Who Served 17 Years Was Innocent of 
Rape, DA Says, CNN.COM (Mar. 2, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-03-02/justice/ 
texas.rape.exoneration_1_dna-tests-new-dna-texas-man?_s=PM:CRIME.  Mr. Rodri­
guez was released in 2004 after an appeals court found that faulty scientific evidence 
had been used against him in his 1987 trial. Id.  New DNA tests on certain forensic 
evidence ruled out Mr. Rodriguez as the perpetrator. Id.  While Texas state officials 
originally denied a pardon, Harris County District Attorney Patricia Lykos agreed to 
review the case. Id.  In discussing the matter, Ms. Lykos stated 
[w]hen this scientific inquiry began, there was no legal requirement or man­
date for any further work to be done by our office, because the case had been 
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5 2012] A PROPOSAL: COMPENSATION FOR WRONGFUL IMPRISONMENT 
death penalty cases after the exoneree served time on death row.22 
The Innocence Project has also calculated the average length of the 
time served by an exoneree to be thirteen years; a total of 3,524 
years served by innocent people.23 
Another notable study has identified 340 wrongful convictions, 
196 of which did not involve DNA evidence.24  The study notes that 
more than half of these 340 exonerees served more than ten years 
in prisons, about 80% had been imprisoned for at least five years, 
and the total years in prison for all 340 individuals has been calcu­
lated at 3,400 years.25  A 1987 study identified 350 cases of wrongful 
conviction: 326 in which the defendant was convicted of a homicide 
and twenty-four in which the defendant was sentenced to death for 
the crime of rape.26  This rise in exonerations has led to reform ef­
forts in several states that seek to give prisoners access to DNA 
testing.27 
To some, the fact that a person is exonerated—even after serv­
ing years on death row or otherwise in prison or jail—is evidence of 
the fact that the “system” works.28  To others, these exonerations 
see that the truth emerges, and that justice is done. Today, we can state that 
an innocent man has been vindicated. 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
22. Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, supra note 21.  There have been 
138 death penalty exonerations since 1973. Innocence and the Death Penalty, DEATH 
PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=412 (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2012). 
23. Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, supra note 21. 
24. Gross, supra note 17, at 524. 
25. Id. 
26. Karen F. Parker et al., Racial Bias and the Conviction of the Innocent, in 
WRONGLY CONVICTED: PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED JUSTICE 117 (Saundra D. Westervelt 
& John A. Humphrey eds., 2001) (listing various studies on exonerations and racial 
bias). 
27. See Dist. Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, No. 08-6, slip 
op. at 7-8 (U.S. June 18, 2009) (holding that a prisoner has no federal constitutional 
right to post-conviction access to the state’s evidence for DNA testing); Solomon 
Moore, DNA Exoneration Leads to Change in Legal System, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2007, 
at A1, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=980DE2DE1438F932 
A35753C1A9619C8B63 (“State lawmakers across the country are adopting broad 
changes to criminal justice procedures as a response to the exoneration of more than 
200 convicts through the use of DNA evidence.”). 
28. This is the approach taken by Justice Scalia.  For instance, in a concurring 
opinion, the Justice noted: 
[r]eversal of an erroneous conviction on appeal or on habeas, or the pardoning 
of an innocent condemnee through executive clemency, demonstrates not the 
failure of the system but its success.  Those devices are part and parcel of the 
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6 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1 
mean that our system has failed.29  Nevertheless, the question re­
mains: what can the system do after an innocent individual has been 
exonerated? 
The paramount objective for a wrongfully imprisoned individ­
ual is obtaining physical freedom.  Yet, in order for the system to be 
equitable as a whole, it is necessary that the exoneree be monetarily 
compensated.  A just government cannot wrongfully deprive its citi­
zens of life, liberty, or property without compensation.  Some juris­
dictions have enacted statutes, attempting to assist exonerees with 
monetary and other compensation.  It is fully appropriate that the 
state provides compensation.  It is generally accepted that mistakes 
are an inherent part of a large criminal justice system.  Given that 
society as a whole accepts this risk of error in order to maintain 
public safety, “the loss when [an error] occurs should be borne by 
the community as a whole and not by the injured individual 
alone.”30 
Most exonerees, especially those who have served a substantial 
amount of time in prison, struggle to find housing and work after 
their release from prison.31  In some states, more assistance is pro­
vided to parolees than to exonerees.32  A lack of uniformity exists 
in state and federal laws dealing with compensation. This is due in 
no small part to the multifaceted nature of the problem. This arti­
cle considers the different procedural, economic, and social calcula­
tions that must be taken into consideration before “justly” 
compensating an innocent individual. 
Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 193 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring). But see Elizabeth 
Brandenburg, Kansas v. Marsh: A Thumb on the Scale of Death?, 58 MERCER L. REV. 
1447, 1457-61 (2007) (discussing Justice Scalia’s concurrence); David Grann, Trial by 
Fire: Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man, NEW  YORKER, Sept. 7, 2009, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/09/07/090907fa_fact_grann. 
29. See, e.g., Bruce P. Smith, The History of Wrongful Execution, 56 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1185, 1186-87 (2005). 
30. Edwin M. Borchard, State Indemnity for Errors of Criminal Justice, in 52 AN­
NALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 108, 110 (Em­
ory R. Johnson ed., 1914). 
31. See Jeffrey Chinn & Ashley Ratliff, “I Was Put Out the Door With Noth­
ing”—Addressing the Needs of the Exonerated Under a Refugee Model, 45 CAL. W. L. 
REV. 405, 407 (2009); Janet Roberts & Elizabeth Stanton, A Long Road Back After 
Exoneration, and Justice Is Slow to Make Amends, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2007, at 138, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/25/us/25dna.html?pagewanted=all (survey­
ing more than 130 DNA exonerees and noting that dozens face severe struggles on their 
reentry to society). 
32. For more background on life “after exoneration,” see After Exoneration, IN­
NOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/After-Exoneration.php (last 
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7 2012] A PROPOSAL: COMPENSATION FOR WRONGFUL IMPRISONMENT 




Statutes governing compensation for wrongfully imprisoned in­
dividuals have been enacted by 24 states,33 the District of Colum­
bia,34 and the federal government.35  The elements that must be 
proven or disproved to sustain a claim for compensation, as well as 
the scope of a compensation award, vary significantly among these 
33. These states are Alabama, California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, 
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Vir­
ginia, West Virginia and Wisconsin. See ALA. CODE §§ 29-2-150 to 165 (LexisNexis 
2003); CAL. PENAL  CODE §§ 4900-4906 (West 2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-102uu 
(2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 961 (West Supp. 2011); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/8(c) 
(West 2007 & Supp. 2011); IOWA  CODE  ANN. § 663A.1 (West 1998); LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 15:572.8 (Supp. 2011), amended by 2011 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 262 (H.B. 285) 
(West); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 8241-8244 (2003); MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. 
& PROC. § 10-501 (LexisNexis 2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258D, §§ 1-9 (2008 & Supp. 
2010); MO. ANN. STAT. § 650.055 (West 2006 & Supp. 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 541-B:14(II) (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:4C-1 to -6 (West 2009); N.Y. CT. CL. ACT 
§ 8-b (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 148-82 to -84 (2009); OHIO 
REV. CODE  ANN. §§ 2743.48-.49 (West 2006 & Supp. 2011) (the constitutionality of a 
portion of this statute was placed in doubt by Nelson v. Ohio, 2010 Ohio 1777 (Ct. Cl. 
2010)); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 154 (West 2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-108(a)(7) 
(Supp. 2011); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE  ANN. §§ 103.001 to .003 (West 2011); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-405 (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, 
§ 5574 (2009); VA. CODE  ANN. §§ 8.01-195.10 to 195.12 (2007 & Supp. 2011); W. VA. 
CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a (LexisNexis 2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 775.05 (West 2009).  Ad­
ditionally, Montana offers educational aid (if exonerated by postconviction DNA test­
ing), but no monetary compensation. See  MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-1-214 (2009). These 
statutes are available on the website of the Innocence Project, which also provides brief 
summaries of each. See Reforms by State, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocence 
project.org/news/LawView1.php (last visited Apr. 15, 2012). 
34. See D.C. CODE §§ 2-421 to -425 (LexisNexis 2008). 
35. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1495, 2513 (2006); see also Report to the House of Delegates, 
A.B.A. SECTION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1-10 (2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/ 
crimjust/policy/my05108a.pdf [hereinafter ABA Report] (discussing passage and effect 
of federal legislation).  For a thorough discussion of compensation statutes, see gener­
ally the scholarship of Professor Adele Bernhard:  Adele Bernhard, When Justice Fails: 
Indemnification for Unjust Conviction, 6 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 73 (1999) [here­
inafter Bernhard I]; Adele Bernhard, Justice Still Fails: A Review of Recent Efforts to 
Compensate Individuals Who Have Been Unjustly Convicted and Later Exonerated, 52 
DRAKE L. REV. 703 (2004) [hereinafter Bernhard II]. For model compensation stat­
utes, see ABA Report, supra, at 1-10 (urging adoption of compensation statutes, recom­
mending statutory provisions, and surveying existing statutes); An Act Concerning 
Claims for Wrongful Conviction and Imprisonment, INNOCENCE PROJECT, [hereinafter 
Innocence Project: Model Statute], available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/ 
Compensation08.pdf (last updated Nov. 2007) (comprehensive model compensation 
statute); Lauri Constantine et al., Model Prevention and Remedy of Erroneous Convic­
tions Act, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 665, 699, 710-713 (2001) [hereinafter Arizona State Law 
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8 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1 
jurisdictions.  But there are certain commonalities or trends. This 
section examines several key provisions of current compensation 
statutes and makes recommendations on each topic for incorpora­
tion into the proposed statute.  These topics include: 1) legislative 
findings to guide courts and agencies in applying the statute; 2) gen­
eral eligibility requirements regarding (a) the loss of liberty and 
type of crime for which a term of imprisonment was served, (b) 
conduct of the claimant in association with his or her arrest or con­
viction, (c) the existence of other criminal convictions, (d) the 
method of exoneration, and (e) the establishment of innocence of 
the crime of wrongful imprisonment; 3) the procedures for bringing 
a compensation claim, including the proper forum and  the statute 
of limitations; 4) the calculation of the award, including the factors 
to be considered and burden of proof in demonstrating damages; 
and 5) the procedure permitting an individual whose conviction has 
been reversed on procedural grounds to apply for the issuance of a 
declaration of actual innocence in order to qualify for 
compensation. 
A.	 Legislative Findings in the Statutes of New York, New Jersey, 
and West Virginia 
1. Statutory Survey 
Legislative findings are included in the compensation statutes 
of three states: New York,36 New Jersey,37 and West Virginia.38  The 
findings express the statutes’ remedial purposes and provide gui­
dance as to their intended applications, as well as offering a statu­
tory embodiment of legislative history that can guide courts and 
agencies.39  The New Jersey legislature, for example, 
finds and declares that innocent persons who have been con­
victed of crimes and subsequently imprisoned have been frus­
trated in seeking legal redress and that such persons should have 
an available avenue of redress over and above the existing tort 
36. See N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b. 
37. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C. 
38. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a. 
39. See supra notes 36-38; see also 2004 Mass. Legis. Serv. Ch. 444 (H.B. 4255) 
(West) (legislative report emphasizing the sense of immediacy underlying passage of the 
Commonwealth’s compensation statute: “Whereas, The deferred operation of this act 
would tend to defeat its purpose, which is forthwith to provide a method of compensa­
tion for certain erroneous felony convictions, therefore it is hereby declared to be an 
emergency law, necessary for the immediate preservation of the public convenience.”) 
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9 2012] A PROPOSAL: COMPENSATION FOR WRONGFUL IMPRISONMENT 
remedies to seek compensation for damages. The Legislature in­
tends by enactment of the provisions of this act that those inno­
cent persons who can demonstrate by clear and convincing 
evidence that they were mistakenly convicted and imprisoned be 
able to recover damages against the State. 
In light of the substantial burden of proof that must be car­
ried by such persons, it is the intent of the Legislature that the 
court, in exercising its discretion as permitted by law regarding 
the weight and admissibility of evidence submitted pursuant to 
this section, may, in the interest of justice, give due consideration 
to difficulties of proof caused by the passage of time, the death or 
unavailability of witnesses, the destruction of evidence or other 
factors not caused by such persons or those acting on their 
behalf.40 
The West Virginia statute makes similar findings, but also includes 
“innocent persons wrongly arrested,” though not convicted, among 
those who “should have an available avenue of redress over and 
above the existing tort remedies to seek compensation for 
damages.”41 
The insufficiency of current remedies is thus acknowledged di­
rectly in the statutes.  Although the burden of proof in demonstrat­
ing actual innocence is “substantial,” typical evidentiary 
requirements may be relaxed to avoid an inequitable result.  Over­
all, these considerations demonstrate that a compensation statute 
represents a meaningful avenue of relief for exonerees. 
2. Suggested Approach for Proposed Statute 
The proposed compensation statute has been drafted to in­
clude similar preliminary findings as those cited in the New Jersey 
statute.  These findings provide useful guidance to claimants, law­
yers, courts, agencies, and other parties interpreting the statute. 
B. General Eligibility Requirements and Limitations 
While compensation statutes serve obvious remedial purposes, 
they generally limit eligibility for compensation to a relatively nar­
row class of persons.42  Proof of a wrongful conviction alone almost 
40. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-1. 
41. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a(a). 
42. See ABA Report, supra note 35, at 1, 5-7 (making recommendations on re­
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10 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1 
never entitles one to compensation under these statutes.43  Typical 
“conditions precedent” to recovery include requirements that: (1) 
the claimant suffered actual imprisonment following the wrongful 
conviction for a felony or misdemeanor; (2) the claimant did not 
cause or bring about his or her own conviction; (3) the claimant did 
not serve a sentence of imprisonment for another conviction con­
currently with the wrongful conviction and is not presently serving a 
prison sentence; (4) the claimant be exonerated by an executive 
pardon or a judicial determination; and (5) an exoneration by judi­
cial determination be proven by clear and convincing evidence of 
innocence.  The proposed statute adopts some of these approaches 
while rejecting others. 
1. Actual Imprisonment Requirement 
a. Statutory survey 
Proof that the wrongfully convicted person was actually incar­
cerated is required under all existing compensation statutes.44  Most 
require that incarceration be followed by a wrongful conviction in 
the corresponding jurisdiction.45  For instance, under New York’s 
statute, “[a]ny person convicted and subsequently imprisoned for 
one or more felonies or misdemeanors against the state which he 
did not commit may . . . present a claim for damages against the 
state.”46  The District of Columbia Code similarly provides that, 
“[a]ny person unjustly convicted of and subsequently imprisoned 
for a criminal offense contained in the District of Columbia Code 
may present a claim for damages against the District of Colum­
bia.”47  Under these and similarly worded provisions in other stat­
utes, a person is not eligible for compensation if the sentence 
received was other than a term of imprisonment (such as probation) 
or if the conviction was set aside prior to serving a prison sentence, 
43. See infra Part II.B.5. 
44. See supra notes 33-35. 
45. See, e.g., N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(2) (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 2011). But see 
ALA. CODE § 29-2-156 (LexisNexis 2003) (“In order to be eligible to receive compensa­
tion for wrongful incarceration a person must: (1) Have been convicted by the State of 
one or more felony offenses, all of which the person was innocent, and have served time 
in prison as a result of the conviction or convictions; or (2) Have been incarcerated 
pretrial on a state felony charge, for at least two years through no fault of his or her 
own, before having charges dismissed based on innocence.”); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14­
2-13a(b) (“Any person arrested or imprisoned or convicted and subsequently impris­
oned for one or more felonies or misdemeanors against the state which he did not 
commit may . . . present a claim for damages against the state.”) (emphasis added). 
46. N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(2). 
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2012] A PROPOSAL: COMPENSATION FOR WRONGFUL IMPRISONMENT 11 
even if the person was detained prior to conviction (such as where 
bail is denied).48 
There is greater variation among statutes regarding the classes 
of crimes for which a wrongfully imprisoned person may receive 
compensation.  Some statutes provide compensation exclusively for 
imprisonment for felonies,49 and others for both felonies and mis­
demeanors.50  Others do not specify the types of crimes, instead re­
ferring only to convictions for criminal offenses that resulted in 
incarceration in the prisons of the state.51 
b. Suggested approach for proposed statute 
The proposed statute adopts a fair and straightforward formu­
lation, recognizing that compensation should be made to persons 
wrongfully imprisoned for any crime recognized in the jurisdiction, 
regardless of the level of offense. The appropriate level of compen­
sation may vary depending on the length and conditions of impris­
onment.  It is not reasonable to exclude wrongful convictions on the 
basis of their designation as misdemeanors, as opposed to felonies, 
as this distinction carries some level of arbitrariness. 
It is appropriate to exclude compensation for persons who 
were never actually imprisoned pre-trial or post-trial.  Arguably, 
these individuals were permitted to maintain gainful employment 
when they were on bail.  Statutory compensation must, however, be 
provided for individuals who were not convicted but were neverthe­
less incarcerated prior to or during trial if these individuals are ac­
tually exonerated of the alleged crime under the statutory 
48. Such a person, however, might seek redress in a suit for false arrest, false 
imprisonment, malicious prosecution, or a violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 . See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
49. See ALA. CODE § 29-2-156 (felony or two years pretrial detention for felony 
offense); CAL. PENAL  CODE § 4900 (West 2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258D § 1(C) 
(2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-1-214 (2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-82 (2009); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(A)(2) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, 
§ 154(B)(1), (2)(a) (West 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.10(B) (2007 & Supp. 2011). 
50. See  IOWA  CODE  ANN. § 663A.1(1)(a) (West 1998) (emphasis added) 
(“[I]ndividual was charged . . . with the commission of a public offense classified as an 
aggravated misdemeanor or felony.”); N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(3); W. VA. CODE § 14-2­
13a(b).  The Iowa Supreme Court has held that “a simple misdemeanor is a public of­
fense” for purposes of the state’s compensation statute, but that violation of “municipal 
ordinances” do not qualify.  Wright v. Cedar Falls, 424 N.W.2d 456, 457 (Iowa 1988) 
(citing Wenck v. State, 320 N.W.2d 567, 569 (Iowa 1982)). 
51. Among these is the federal compensation statue.  28 U.S.C. § 1495; see also 
D.C. CODE § 2-421; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8241(2) (2003); MD. CODE  ANN., 
STATE FIN. & PROC. § 10-501(a) (LexisNexis 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-3(a) (West 
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framework.  Although in these situations the exoneree may seek 
compensation under state common law torts, such as malicious 
prosecution, or federal statutory law, a person exonerated of a 
crime that he or she did not commit should not have to suffer 
through the numerous procedural hurdles and limitations under 
these traditional remedies. 
For example, state actors may claim qualified immunity in an 
action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, where an exoneree cannot 
show that the “official ‘knew or reasonably should have known that 
the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would 
violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff], or [that] he took 
the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of 
constitutional rights or other injury.’”52  A simple showing of prob­
able cause to initiate a proceeding is a defense to suits for malicious 
prosecution and false arrest, even for exonerated individuals.53 
Where an exoneree was indicted by a grand jury, a malicious prose­
cution claim will be successful only where the exoneree can “estab­
lish that the indictment was produced by fraud, perjury, the 
suppression of evidence or other police conduct undertaken in bad 
faith.”54 
Although some wrongful imprisonments are the product of 
malicious or fraudulent state conduct, many are the unfortunate re­
sult of good faith failings of the criminal justice system, such as eye­
witness misidentifications or inadequate legal representation. 
These victims of the system are left without means of relief under 
traditional remedies.  Further, municipal liability is available under 
§ 1983 only in exceptional circumstances, where “the combined acts 
or omissions of several employees acting under a governmental pol­
icy or custom . . . violate” the plaintiff’s rights.55  An exoneree may 
be left to pursue individual prosecutors or police who are unlikely 
to have the ability to pay compensatory damages. 
52. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982) (first alteration in original) 
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975)). 
53. See, e.g., Savino v. City of New York, 331 F.3d 63, 72 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting 
that under New York law, “the existence of probable cause is a complete defense to a 
claim of malicious prosecution”); Devatt v. Lohenitz, 338 F. Supp. 2d 588, 590 (E.D. Pa. 
2004) (stating that a detective who arrested suspect had qualified immunity as to sus­
pect’s § 1983 claim alleging improper prosecution, where a reasonable officer could 
have found probable cause for arrest, suspect was released once exonerating evidence 
arose, and charges against suspect were withdrawn). 
54. Rothstein v. Carriere, 373 F.3d 275, 283 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Colon v. City 
of New York, 455 N.E.2d 1248, 1251 (N.Y. 1983)). 
55. Barrett v. Orange Cnty. Human Rights Comm’n, 194 F.3d 341, 350 (2d Cir. 
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2012] A PROPOSAL: COMPENSATION FOR WRONGFUL IMPRISONMENT 13 
States might choose to bar double recovery, but the exoneree 
should be permitted to proceed under the statutory framework and 
common law torts.  The argument that pretrial detention is compar­
atively short and is not punitive in nature56 does not account for 
situations in which an individual has spent several months—if not 
years—in pre-trial detention, only to be later exonerated of the 
crime.  Concerns that the statute will affect the public fisc, by per­
mitting recovery by individuals who were incarcerated pre-trial but 
later exonerated of the crime, are valid.  Fundamental fairness, 
however, requires that all persons who were wrongfully imprisoned 
for any length of time—pre-trial or post-trial—be compensated for 
the system’s failures. 
2.	 Requirement that the Individual Did Not Cause His 
Conviction or Plead Guilty 
a.	 Statutory survey 
Seven jurisdictions require that the wrongful conviction and 
imprisonment not be attributable to the conduct of the exoneree57 
and five require that the individual did not plead guilty to the 
crime.58  The District of Columbia has both requirements.59 
56. See ABA Report, supra note 35, at 3.  As noted in the report: 
Some may argue that post-conviction incarceration is no different than time 
spent in jail awaiting trial before acquittal.  However, pretrial detention is of 
relatively limited duration and not intended as punishment.  Similarly, incar­
ceration before a reversal on direct appeal does not result in compensation, 
except in limited circumstances such as when the arrest lacked probable cause. 
Again, direct appeal has a predictable timeframe, and many reversals are 
based on evidentiary or constitutional violations that vindicate the integrity of 
the system, not a determination of innocence.  In contrast, most of those who 
have been exonerated have spent years protesting their innocence with no re­
alistic expectation that collateral attacks on their convictions will be heard, let 
alone result in their exoneration. 
Id. 
57. See 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)(2) (2006); CAL. PENAL  CODE §§ 4903, 4904 (West 
2011); D.C. CODE § 2-422(2) (LexisNexis 2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-3 (West 2009); 
N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(4)(b) (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01­
195.10(B) (2007 & Supp. 2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a(e)(3), (f)(5) (LexisNexis 
2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 775.05(4) (West 2009). 
58. See D.C. CODE § 2-425 (LexisNexis 2008) (excepting “Alford pleas” by refer­
ring to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970)); IOWA CODE ANN. § 663A.1(1)(b) 
(West 1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258D § 1(C) (2008); OHIO  REV. CODE  ANN. 
§ 2743.48(A)(2) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 154(B)(2)(b) 
(West 2008).  For a description of the exception under the District of Columbia statute, 
see infra note 64. 
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14 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1 
The former requirement is most expansively formulated in the 
California statute, where “[t]he claimant must prove . . . the fact 
that he or she did not, by any act or omission on his or her part, 
intentionally contribute to the bringing about of his or her arrest or 
conviction for the crime with which he or she was charged . . . .”60 
Other jurisdictions take a more limited approach, requiring that the 
exoneree did not cause his or her conviction by the exoneree’s own 
act or failure to act, or misconduct or neglect.61  The New Jersey, 
New York, and West Virginia statutes state it more briefly: the per­
son must “not by his own conduct cause or bring about his 
conviction.”62 
The compensation statutes in Iowa, Massachusetts, Ohio, and 
Oklahoma do not contain such a requirement, but limit coverage to 
persons who did not plead guilty to the offense charged or to a 
lesser included offense.63  The District of Columbia similarly ex­
cludes “any person whose conviction resulted from his entering a 
plea of guilty.”64  This exclusion exempts guilty pleas entered “pur­
60. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4903. 
61. See 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)(2); D.C. CODE § 2-422(2); VA. CODE  ANN. § 8.01­
195.10(B); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 775.05(4). 
62. N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(4)(b); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-3(a); W. VA. 
CODE §§ 14-2-13a(e)(3), (f)(5); Bernhard II, supra note 35, at 718 n.85 (collecting New 
York State cases where this provision has been used to disqualify claimants). This dis­
qualification, according to the drafters of the New York statute, 
was intended to require that the person seeking damages . . . establish that he 
did not cause or bring about his prosecution by reason of his own miscon­
duct[;] . . . such misconduct would include falsely giving an uncoerced confes­
sion of guilt, removing evidence, attempting to induce a witness to give false 
testimony, attempting to suppress testimony, . . . concealing the guilt of 
another, 
and even “plead[ing] guilty.”  Bernhard II, supra note 35, at 717-18 (quoting N.Y. 
STATE  LAW  REVISION  COMM’N, REPORT OF THE  LAW  REVISION  COMMISSION TO THE 
GOVERNOR ON REDRESS FOR INNOCENT PERSONS UNJUSTLY CONVICTED AND SUBSE­
QUENTLY IMPRISONED, 1984 N.Y. Laws 2899, 2932). 
Some proposed statutes more narrowly define the categories of conduct attributa­
ble to the claimant. See Arizona State Law Journal: Model Act, supra note 35, at 711 
(commenting that a claimant may be “responsible” where he “presents himself at a 
police station, claims to be guilty of a crime, and presents evidence of guilt that police 
and prosecutors could not reasonably be expected to discern to be false”); Innocence 
Project: Model Statute, supra note 35, § 4(A), (A)(2) (“[a] claimant must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that: . . . [h]e did not commit or suborn perjury, or 
fabricate evidence to cause or bring about his conviction.”). 
63. See IOWA  CODE  ANN. § 663A.1(1)(b); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258D § 1(C); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(A)(2); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 154(B)(2)(b). 
64. D.C. CODE § 2-425 (referring to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 
(1970)).  An “Alford plea” is a “guilty plea that a defendant enters as part of a plea 
bargain without actually admitting guilt.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 78 (8th ed. 2004). 
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2012] A PROPOSAL: COMPENSATION FOR WRONGFUL IMPRISONMENT 15 
suant to North Carolina v. Alford” because an Alford plea is en­
tered to avoid prosecution rather than to admit guilt.65 
The District of Columbia statute, unlike the others mentioned 
here, apparently draws a distinction between convictions resulting 
from a person’s conduct and convictions resulting from guilty pleas. 
Six jurisdictions expressly prohibit compensation for persons whose 
conduct led to their conviction and do not expressly do the same for 
persons who pleaded guilty.  It is arguable that guilty pleas would 
be subsumed under the attributable conduct category in these juris­
dictions.66  If so, persons who pleaded guilty would be barred from 
receiving compensation on the ground that their convictions re­
sulted from their own conduct.  The drafters of the New York stat­
ute have interpreted the limitation in this manner.67 
b. Suggested approach for proposed statute 
The proposed statute does not bar compensation because a 
person entered a guilty plea or an Alford plea.  Innocent individuals 
often plead guilty to crimes for a host of reasons, including ineffec­
tive assistance of counsel, overwhelming evidence of guilt based on 
false confessions or inaccurate forensics, financial and social rea­
sons such as to avoid a costly, embarrassing trial, and pressure by 
busy defense lawyers and prosecutors.68  Further, a coerced confes­
sion, even if not per se unconstitutional, or other self-incriminating 
events after the commission of the alleged crime should not disqual­
ify a claimant.69  By the same measure, wrongful conduct such as 
suborning perjury or fabricating evidence, if occurring following the 
mits that sufficient evidence exists with which the government can convince the trier of 
fact that the defendant is guilty. 
65. See supra note 64. 
66. See Bernhard II, supra note 35, at 704.  Bernhard explains that some state 
statutes “contain inartful language, which permits states to argue that a person who 
confessed or entered a plea of guilty should be disqualified from recovering–even if the 
confession or plea was clearly false.” Id.  The Innocence Project’s proposed statute has 
managed to avoid such “inartfulness.” See Innocence Project: Model Statute, supra 
note 35, § 4(A)(2) (emphasis added) (“[N]either a confession or admission later found 
to be false, nor a guilty plea to a crime the claimant did not commit, constitutes bringing 
about his own conviction under this Act.”). 
67. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
68. See Bernhard II, supra note 35, at 720 (explaining that individuals are some­
times urged to plead guilty by their attorneys “who may doubt their innocence and fear 
the worst outcome after trial” but this does not qualify as the sort of “illegitimate mo­
tive” that perhaps could justify disqualification); see also ABA Report, supra note 35, at 
7 (the determination of whether a guilty plea bars recovery should be “highly fact 
specific.”). 
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16 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1 
commission of the charged crime, should lead to disqualification. 
The proposed statute only bars compensation for individuals who 
“by any act or omission related to the conduct of the alleged of­
fense at the time and/or place of occurrence of the alleged offense, 
or by falsely giving an uncoerced confession of guilt, committing or 
suborning perjury, or fabricating evidence, caused or brought about 
[their own] wrongful imprisonment.”70  This provision is designed 
to prevent large-scale drug dealers, organized crime members, and 
drunk drivers from recovering damages if their illegal conduct or 
activities contributed to their arrest and conviction, even if they are 
innocent of the specific crime charged. 
3. Requirement that the Individual Had No Other Sentence 
a. Statutory survey 
Under some statutes, an individual cannot seek compensation 
if he or she served a sentence for an unrelated conviction concur­
rently with the sentence for the crime for which he or she was 
wrongfully convicted.  Further, compensation is barred if an indi­
vidual is serving a prison term for a crime other than the crime for 
which he or she was wrongfully convicted. New Jersey is represen­
tative of this approach.71  Texas has adopted the exclusion for con­
current sentences with similar language,72 while Massachusetts and 
Oklahoma restate the eligibility condition in terms of incarceration 
The mere existence of an inculpatory statement or a confession should never 
defeat a claim.  Only an uncoerced false confession specifically intended to 
distort the truth-seeking function of the police investigation should prevent 
recovery.  In determining whether a confession was the product of coercion, 
courts should presume all false confessions to be the product of coercion un­
less they can be shown otherwise by clear and convincing evidence. 
Bernhard II, supra note 35, at 720.  Further, “multiple exonerations prove that innocent 
people falsely implicate themselves, despite gaining nothing for themselves in the pro­
cess.” Id. at 718 (footnotes omitted).  “The fact that a young, mentally challenged, 
chemically dependent, submissive, or just plain scared individual succumbs to police 
interrogation techniques and confesses to a crime that he or she did not commit no 
longer seems like misconduct that should prevent recovery years later when the truth 
finally surfaces.” Id. at 720; see also ABA Report, supra note 35 at 1, 7 (advocating that 
false confessions should not “automatically bar recovery.”); Compensating the Wrongly 
Convicted, INNOCENCE  PROJECT, http://ip.integreat-dev.com/Content/309PRINT.php 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2012) (“Statutes should not contain provisions that require exoner­
ees to prove that they did not ‘contribute’ to their wrongful conviction,” because, “[b]y 
doing so, states avoid restitution to exonerees coerced into confessing to a crime.”). 
70. See infra text accompanying note 244. 
71. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-6 (West 2009); see also VA. CODE  ANN. § 8.01­
195.12(A) (2007 & Supp. 2011). 
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2012] A PROPOSAL: COMPENSATION FOR WRONGFUL IMPRISONMENT 17 
solely for the conviction that is the subject of the compensation 
claim.73  The Alabama statute adopts both of the above limitations 
and adds a further condition:  “A person awarded compensation 
and subsequently convicted of a felony crime will not be eligible to 
receive any unpaid amounts” of the award.74 
b. Suggested approach for proposed statute 
The proposed statute only bars compensation for an individual 
who was serving a concurrent sentence for a crime other than the 
crime for which the individual was wrongfully imprisoned.75  It does 
not bar recovery for an individual who was convicted of another 
crime subsequent to being exonerated. 
Barring recovery where an individual served concurrent time 
for more than one crime but was only exonerated for one of those 
crimes is a sensible limitation, assuming that the individual did not 
serve additional time because of the wrongful conviction.  It is pos­
sible that a person may have received a lesser sentence, or no jail 
time at all, had the wrongful conviction never occurred.  A fair ap­
proach incorporates a rebuttable presumption that some requisite 
extra period of incarceration was not caused by the wrongful con­
viction.76  Although it can be argued that such an approach is not 
feasible in light of the multiplicity of state sentencing practices and 
the practical difficulties of rebutting such a presumption, the ABA 
Report lays out the groundwork of a just and reasonable approach 
which states might revise to accommodate their own sentencing 
practices.77  The proposed statute adopts this approach. 
The second condition in some state statutes, that the individual 
not be currently serving prison time for a separate conviction, also 
raises fairness issues.78  The argument for not compensating such 
73. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258D § 1(C)(v) (2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, 
§ 154(B)(2)(d) (West 2008). 
74. ALA. CODE § 29-2-161(e) (LexisNexis 2003); accord VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01­
195.12(A). 
75. See infra text accompanying note 242. 
76. The ABA Report suggests that the burden of showing “that the claimant 
would have otherwise been incarcerated” be “placed on the government.” ABA Re­
port, supra note 35, at 1, 8 (“Claimants are eligible for compensation only if, but for this 
conviction, the claimant would not have been incarcerated. The government should 
have the burden of demonstrating that the claimant would have otherwise been incar­
cerated.”); see also id. at 8 (explaining this proposed provision). 
77. ABA Report, supra note 35, at 1, 8. 
78. Cf. Bernhard II, supra note 35 at 721-22 (arguing that a prior felony convic­
tion should not preclude recovery under a compensation statute, but that damages 
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18 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1 
individuals is that the state should not compensate a known crimi­
nal.79  But this rationale does not always correlate to the basic ten­
ets of fairness.  The proposed statute will compensate those inmates 
who serve longer periods of incarceration because of a wrongful 
conviction, despite the fact that the inmate is also serving a concur­
rent sentence for another crime. 
4. Method of Exoneration 
a. Statutory survey 
There are two ways that wrongfully convicted persons may es­
tablish their innocence and qualify for compensation: executive par­
don or judicial determination.80  The exoneree may use either 
method in nine jurisdictions: Alabama, Massachusetts, New Jersey, 
New York, Oklahoma, Texas, West Virginia, the District of Colum­
bia, and the federal government.81  In six jurisdictions, a pardon is 
the sole means of establishing innocence: California, Illinois, Maine, 
Maryland, North Carolina, and Tennessee.82 
79. See Fernanda Santos and Janet Roberts, Putting a Price on a Wrongful Con­
viction, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2007, at C4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/ 
02/weekinreview/02santos.html (“I believe the taxpayer would be horribly offended if 
their money were to be spent compensating an exonerated prisoner who has a history of 
serious crimes,” said a state representative in Florida, where “lawmakers have battled 
for three years over a compensation plan that would exclude those with prior criminal 
histories.”). 
80. See Bernhard I, supra note 35, at 103-04 (summarizing approaches of differ­
ent jurisdictions). 
81. See 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)(1) (2006); ALA. CODE §§ 29-2-157 to -160(a) (Lexis-
Nexis 2003); D.C. CODE § 2-422(1) (LexisNexis 2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258D 
§ 1(B) (2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-4 (West 2009); N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(5)(b) 
(McKinney 1989 & Supp. 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 154(B)(1) (West 2008); 
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE  ANN. § 103.001(a)(2)(A), (B) (West 2011); W. VA. 
CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a(d)(2)(3) (LexisNexis 2009); see also Rosanna Ruiz, Man Freed 
in Rape Fights to Clear Name, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 18, 2007, http://www.chron.com/ 
news/houston-texas/article/Man-freed-in-rape-fights-to-clear-name-1814287.php 
(describing how a wrongfully convicted person in Texas was “ineligible for the state 
reimbursement of $50,000 for each of the 17 years he served in prison because he ha[d] 
not been officially pardoned” or judicially determined to be innocent). 
82. See  CAL. PENAL CODE § 4900 (West 2011); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/ 
8(c) (West 2007 & Supp. 2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8241(2)(c) (2003); MD. 
CODE ANN., STATE  FIN. & PROC. § 10-501(b) (LexisNexis 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 148-82 (2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-27-109 (2006). 
The political aspect of the pardon requirement is demonstrated by the experience 
in Illinois. See Bernhard I, supra note 35, at 102-03.  In the fifty years following this 
statute’s enactment, “there were only two successful indemnification claims in the state, 
despite the occurrence of many wrongful convictions there.” Id. at 102.  When the po­
litical climate changed in the late 1990s, more pardons were granted and seven claims 
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There are variations among states in the types of judicial deter­
minations required.  In Louisiana, the conviction must be reversed 
or vacated, and there must be an additional judicial finding of fac­
tual innocence.83  New Hampshire refers only to “a person . . . 
found to be innocent,”84 and Montana only to convictions set aside 
through DNA testing.85  Iowa and Ohio refer to convictions that 
are vacated, dismissed, or reversed on appeal.86 
Some states require special determinations of innocence. The 
Virginia statute requires that the conviction be “vacated” pursuant 
to a writ of actual innocence.87  Wisconsin permits a claims board to 
determine a person’s innocence after notice is given to the prose­
cuting attorney and the judge who imposed the sentence.88 
b. Suggested approach for proposed statute 
The proposed statute adopts the approach of the nine jurisdic­
tions that allow actual innocence to be proven pursuant to either 
executive pardon or judicial determination.89  Inclusion of the par­
don as a vehicle for establishing innocence accords well with the 
conventional discretion of the executive in enforcing laws and ad­
ministering sentences.  Limiting the manner of proof to pardons 
will severely limit the reach of a compensation statute because the 
granting of pardons is often dictated by the political climate of the 
One federal case upheld the constitutionality of conditioning a compensation claim 
on a gubernatorial pardon. See Ross v. North Carolina, No. 5:06-CV-218-D, 2007 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 87067, at *16-19, *23 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 31, 2007) (citations omitted)), aff’d, 
239 Fed. Appx. 782 (4th Cir. 2007).  The plaintiff “allege[d] that providing compensa­
tion only to persons receiving a pardon of innocence . . and not to all persons whose 
convictions are set aside violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.” Id. at *17 (emphasis omitted).  The court disagreed, explaining that this 
prerequisite was “rationally related to making payments only to people whom the Gov­
ernor believes are innocent.”  Id. at *19.  A state may therefore position a pardon as the 
exclusive means of proving innocence for eligibility purposes. See id.  The court went 
on to dismiss a “veritable smorgasbord” of other constitutional claims against North 
Carolina’s pardon requirement. Id. at *23.  It rejected plaintiff’s contention that the 
statute “violate[d] the Establishment Clause because it requires petitioners to seek 
‘grace’ from the Governor.” Id. at *16 (emphasis omitted). 
83. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8 (2011), amended by 2011 La. Sess. Law 
Serv. Act 262 (H.B. 285) (West). 
84. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-B:14(II) (2007). 
85. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-1-214 (2009). 
86. IOWA  CODE  ANN. § 663A.1(1)(d), (3) (West 1998); OHIO  REV. CODE  ANN. 
§ 2743.48(A)(4) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011). 
87. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.10(B) (2007 & Supp. 2011). 
88. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 775.05(3) (West 2009). 
89. “Judicial declarations of actual innocence” are generally considered “judicial 
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state and typically hinges on the advocacy efforts of local public 
figures such as state legislators.90  In contrast, judicial determina­
tion of innocence provides exonerees with a mechanism that may 
be less influenced by the political climate of a particular jurisdic­
tion.  Permitting both of these methods as a means of establishing 
innocence assures fairness in the application of the statute while 
respecting traditional state prerogatives. 
5. Actual Innocence and the Burden of Proof 
a. Statutory Survey 
Compensation statutes also determine the procedures and re­
quirements for establishing innocence.  In states utilizing the par­
don mechanism of establishing innocence, most require that the 
pardon was based on a finding of actual innocence, that the crime 
was not committed by the person, or that it was not committed at 
all.  These limitations and their analogs are included in the statutes 
of California,91 Illinois,92 Maine,93 Massachusetts,94 New York,95 
North Carolina,96 Oklahoma,97 Tennessee,98 Texas,99 West Vir­
ginia,100 District of Columbia,101 and the federal government.102 
The burden of proof in arriving at a finding of innocence is usually 
not specified.  A pardon arising from considerations having nothing 
to do with actual innocence may not be relied on to establish a com­
pensation claim under these statutes. 
90. See Bernhard I, supra note 35, at 102 (describing how “the pardon require­
ment can be an insurmountable barrier to recovery for deserving claimants because 
executive clemency is entirely discretionary.”). Bernhard acknowledges that the par­
don requirement will “prevent an undeserving person from obtaining an award,” but 
criticizes it on grounds that it “will do little to assist one who is truly innocent but is 
unable to rally support with the governor.” Id. at 102-03 (also noting how this require­
ment can produce “unanticipated and arbitrary results”). 
91. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 4900 (West 2011). 
92. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/8(c) (West 2007 & Supp. 2011). 
93. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8241(2)(c) (2003). 
94. See  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258D § 1(B)(i) (2008). 
95. See N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(3)(b)(i) (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 2011). 
96. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-82 (2009). 
97. See  OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 154(B)(1), (2)(a) (West 2008). 
98. See  TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-27-109 (2006). 
99. See  TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.001(a)(2)(A) (West 2011). 
100. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a(d)(2) (LexisNexis 2009). 
101. See D.C. CODE § 2-422(1) (LexisNexis 2008). 
102. See 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)(l) (2006); see also MD. CODE  ANN., STATE  FIN. & 
PROC. § 10-501(b) (LexisNexis 2009) (“An individual is eligible . . . only if the individ­
ual has received from the Governor a full pardon stating that the individual’s conviction 
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Where innocence by judicial determination is an option, the 
burden of proof is designated more specifically.103  Typically, the 
claimant must present “clear and convincing” evidence of inno­
cence,104 which is regarded as a substantial burden of proof.105 
103. See D.C. CODE § 2-422(2); IOWA CODE ANN. § 663A.1(1), (3) (West 1998); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-1 (West 2009); N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(1), (5) (McKinney 1989 
& Supp. 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 154(B)(2)(e)(2) (West 2008); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 19.2-327.13 (2008); W. VA. CODE  ANN. § 14-2-13a(a), (f) (LexisNexis 2009); 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 775.05(3) (West 2009). But see N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541­
B:14(II) (2007) (referring to “a person . . . found to be innocent of the crime for which 
he was convicted,” presumably by judicial determination); OHIO  REV. CODE  ANN. 
§ 2743.48(A)(5) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011) (requiring the court of common pleas to find 
“that the offense of which the individual was found guilty . . . either was not committed 
by the individual or was not committed by any person.”). 
104. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-1; see also D.C. CODE § 2-422(2); IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 663A.1(1), (3); N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(1), (5); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, 
§ 154(B)(2)(e)(2); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a(a), (f); 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 775.05(3); Arizona State Law Journal: Model Act, supra note 35, at 
677 (defining “[a]ctual innocence [to] mean[ ] that a person did not perpetrate the 
crime(s) or any lesser included offense(s) at issue in a given case.”). 
105. Recently, the Iowa Supreme Court elaborated on the “fact-intensive pro­
cess” of proving innocence by clear and convincing evidence: 
The burden imposed on a wrongfully imprisoned person is difficult to 
meet because it requires the person to prove a negative. . . .  Essentially, it 
means the person must show he or she was actually innocent of the crime, or 
no crime occurred. . . .  Thus, . . . it is not enough for the person seeking the 
right to sue for compensation . . . to merely establish that a reviewing court 
determined the conviction was not supported by substantial evidence.  Such a 
finding only signifies [that] a reasonable fact finder could not be convinced of 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  When the crime of conviction was commit­
ted by someone, the person seeking the right to sue as a wrongfully impris­
oned person must affirmatively establish by clear and convincing evidence that 
he or she did not commit the crime or any lesser included crime. 
Normally, a transcript of the evidence at a criminal trial, by itself, will not 
provide the evidence necessary to establish innocence . . . .  [A] wrongfully 
imprisoned person must establish more than the absence of guilt in law to 
establish innocence . . . .  The person must be factually innocent, not merely 
procedurally free from reprosecution or not guilty. 
State v. McCoy, 742 N.W.2d 593, 597-99 (Iowa 2007) (internal citations omitted) (citing 
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960); State v. Dohlman, 725 N.W.2d 428, 
433, 435 (Iowa 2006); Hugo Adam Bedau, Michael A. Radelet & Constance E. Putnam, 
Convicting the Innocent in Capital Cases: Criteria, Evidence, and Inference, 52 DRAKE 
L. REV. 587, 598 (2004) (alterations omitted) (acknowledging that an acquittal or rever­
sal of a conviction may constitute an adjudication of “procedural innocence,” but 
“[w]hether such a defendant was also factually innocent is a further question never 
settled just by the fact that some appellate court correctly found procedural or due 
process objections to the defendant’s conviction or sentence”). 
The court added that “[t]o prove a negative by clear and convincing evidence, it is 
not enough for a wrongfully imprisoned person to merely create questions and doubts 
about his or her involvement in the crime of conviction.” Id. at 599.  The person must 
instead “affirmatively answer those doubts and questions” until there is no serious re­
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22 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1 
Louisiana elaborates that factual innocence may be established 
through “clear and convincing scientific or non-scientific evidence,” 
and defines “factually innocent” as “not [having] commit[ted] the 
crime for which [the applicant] was convicted and incarcerated [and 
not] commit[ting] any crime based upon the same set of facts used 
in his original conviction.”106  Massachusetts uses a “clear and con­
vincing evidence” standard, but also requires “grounds which tend 
to establish the innocence of the individual.”107 
In other states, eligibility turns on whether the prosecutor has 
certified innocence or whether the accusatory instrument has been 
dismissed on grounds of innocence.  In Alabama, an individual is 
eligible for compensation if the conviction is vacated or reversed 
and the accusatory instrument is dismissed on grounds of inno­
cence, or the accusatory instrument is dismissed on grounds consis­
tent with innocence.108 
b. Suggested approach for proposed statute 
The proposed statute, as described earlier, permits innocence 
to be demonstrated pursuant to either an executive pardon or a ju­
dicial determination.109  As to pardons, the statute follows the ma-
Id. at 599 & n.7. See also Dohlman, 725 N.W.2d at 433-36 (claimant “failed to prove by 
clear and convincing evidence” that he did he not commit vehicular manslaughter, 
which requires as an element that the driver be intoxicated; expert testimony at trial 
established that the claimant’s blood alcohol fell within .081 and .096 at the time of the 
accident and that once .08 is reached, “most drivers’ driving skills are measurably im­
paired.”); Ambler v. Rice, No. 95-2328, 1996 WL 543880, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Sep. 26, 
1996) (burden not satisfied in light of the “evidence of opportunity and motive, includ­
ing numerous death threats made against the victim, the concoction of an alibi, and 
incriminating statements [the defendant] made in front of correctional officers after he 
was acquitted.”). 
By contrast, in one New York case, the claimant managed to demonstrate clear and 
convincing evidence: 
innocence of a murder simply by testifying that he had been in another state at 
the time of the crime and by discrediting the credibility of the prosecution’s 
alleged eyewitness—whose testimony was the only evidence linking him to the 
crime—with information about her character that had not been available to 
the defense at the first trial.  Ordinary testimony was sufficient to meet the 
burden. 
Bernhard I, supra note 35, at 108 (footnote omitted) (citing Cleveland v. New York, Ct. 
Cl. No. 74204 (Apr. 22, 1992)). See generally Stanley Z. Fisher, Convictions of Innocent 
Persons in Massachusetts: An Overview, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1 (2002) (providing ex­
amples of cases, old and new, where factual innocence was established or was inferable 
from the circumstances). 
106. See  LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:572.8(A)(2), (B) (Supp. 2011). 
107. See  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258D §§ 1(B)(ii), (C) (2008). 
108. See  ALA. CODE § 29-2-157 (LexisNexis 2003). 
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2012] A PROPOSAL: COMPENSATION FOR WRONGFUL IMPRISONMENT 23 
jority of “pardon” jurisdictions in requiring a specific finding by the 
executive that the claimant was actually innocent of the crime 
charged, including innocence of any lesser included offenses arising 
out of the same facts and circumstances, without specifying the bur­
den of proof.  A more stringent standard would infringe on tradi­
tional executive prerogatives.  Additionally, a pardon might often 
take into account all of the facts surrounding a case.110 
In a majority of “judicial determination” jurisdictions, the bur­
den of proof is clear and convincing evidence of innocence of the 
crime, including innocence of any lesser-included offenses arising 
out of the same facts and circumstances.  As illustrated by the case 
law on the subject, this standard will filter out frivolous or other­
wise meritless claims.111  Significantly, a judicial reversal is not nec­
essarily the same as a finding of factual innocence: a defendant can 
more readily show that procedural or constitutional violations tar­
nished his or her trial or that the guilt was not free from all doubt 
than an exoneree can show that he or she is innocent by clear and 
convincing evidence, so as to gain monetary compensation.112  In 
simpler terms, compensation is not for individuals who are unable 
to prove their innocence in fact.113  Still, the burden of proving in­
110. Still, there may be some concern that executives will be less willing to grant 
pardons, or at least pardons based on determinations of innocence, if those pardoned 
are explicitly given a cause of action against the state. 
111. See, e.g., Reed v. State, 574 N.E.2d 433, 435 (N.Y. 1991) (finding that a re­
versal of the underlying criminal conviction is not equivalent to a finding of innocence 
in a subsequent civil proceeding for wrongful imprisonment involving a lower standard 
than proof beyond a reasonable doubt); Vasquez v. State, 693 N.Y.S.2d 220, 221 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1999) (holding that a reversal of the underlying criminal conviction does not 
establish innocence by clear and convincing evidence); Walden v. State, 547 N.E.2d 962, 
966 (Ohio 1989) (stating that “[a]s a general rule, a verdict or judgment of acquittal in a 
criminal trial is . . . not necessarily a finding that the accused is innocent” for purposes 
of a wrongful imprisonment claim); Le Fevre v. Goodland, 19 N.W.2d 884, 885 (Wis. 
1945) (finding that a determination that the state’s evidence was insufficient to prove 
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt is not equal to finding the defendant is 
innocent beyond a reasonable doubt); see also ABA Report, supra note 35, at 6-7 (ex­
plaining that in those “rare situations where statutory bars prohibit evidence, . . . ethical 
obligation[s] of defense counsel . . . . will . . . prevent a bogus claim of actual 
innocence”). 
112. See, e.g, Ambler v. Rice, No. 95-2328, 1996 WL 543880, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. 
Sep. 26, 1996) (appellate court had ordered a new trial because the trial judge had 
“refused to allow Ambler’s attorney to impeach the credibility of the prosecution’s pri­
mary witness”; defendant acquitted upon retrial but denied compensation due to failure 
to satisfy the “clear and convincing evidence” standard). 
113. See Geoffrey Fattah, Financial Compensation Bill Passes House Committee, 
DESERET MORNING NEWS (Jan. 31, 2008), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/6952489 
90/Financial-compensation-bill-passes-House-committee.html (discussing a state sena­
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24 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1 
nocence does not require proof “beyond a reasonable doubt,” let 
alone metaphysical certainty.114  It is not so severe as to hamper 
truly meritorious claims. 
C. Procedures for Bringing a Compensation Claim 
In addition to requirements relating to the imprisonment, con­
duct, and exoneration of the wrongfully convicted individual, cer­
tain procedural formalities must be followed in order to receive 
compensation.  Generally, the action must be brought in a statuto­
rily determined forum, against a predetermined state defendant 
(which may be the “state” itself), and within a prescribed period of 
time.  The proposed statute provides a specific statute of limita­
tions, but channels suits into the judicial or administrative forum 
where actions against the state ordinarily arise. 
1. Proper Forum 
a. Statutory survey 
All of the compensation statutes recognize that compensation 
for wrongful imprisonment is a liability of the state, rather than any 
individual public official.115  Two other statutes explicitly waive the 
state’s sovereign immunity or declare the state’s consent to be sued. 
Maine provides that, “[n]otwithstanding any immunity of the State 
from suit, including the Maine Tort Claims Act, . . . the State is 
liable for the wrongful imprisonment of a person.”116  Ohio, mean­
while, consents to be sued by a wrongfully imprisoned individual 
and to liability on its part to the extent provided in its compensation 
statute.117  Texas formerly had a similar provision but repealed it 
convicted persons in Utah).  Under the proposed statue, individuals whose convictions 
are overturned on procedural grounds are not automatically precluded from receiving 
compensation. See infra Part II.E.  Rather, such persons are afforded an opportunity to 
demonstrate actual innocence before the appropriate judicial forum. See infra Part 
II.E.  For instance, at least one New York court has held the state to be liable for an 
unjust conviction based solely on the testimony of eyewitness who later recanted. See 
Noeleen G. Walder, State Held Liable for Unjust Murder Conviction Where Only Wit­
ness Admitted Testifying Falsely, N.Y. L.J., July 6, 2009, at 1, 7. 
114. See Bernhard I, supra note 35, at 108 (noting that it “might be expected that 
only DNA exclusion cases could meet the clear and convincing standard, and that such 
a high standard would needlessly thwart meritorious claims,” but that has not been the 
case). 
115. But in some cases an individual public official may be sued for violation of 
federal civil rights or in tort, depending on the laws of the jurisdiction. 
116. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8241(1) (2003). 
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when it changed its statute to provide only an administrative 
remedy.118 
The remaining jurisdictions simply acknowledge that a wrong­
fully convicted person has a cause of action either in the courts or 
before a claims board.  Under the Wisconsin statute, for instance, 
wrongfully convicted and imprisoned persons “may petition the 
claims board for compensation for such imprisonment.”119  In addi­
tion to Wisconsin, seven other states provide compensation by 
claims boards:120 Alabama (Division of Risk Management verifies 
eligibility to Committee on Compensation for Wrongful Convic­
tion);121 California (Victim Compensation and Government Claims 
Board recommends appropriation by legislature);122 Maryland 
(Board of Public Works makes award);123 New Hampshire (board 
of claims);124 North Carolina (Industrial Commissioner makes 
award);125 Oklahoma (Risk Management Administrator of the De­
partment of Central Services);126 and Tennessee (Board of 
Claims).127 
The Virginia statute also provides for administrative-like mech­
anisms.  In Virginia, claims are to be paid by the Comptroller, sub­
ject to approval by the General Assembly.128  Other jurisdictions 
require an action to be brought in a court of competent jurisdiction 
or a court of claims. These include Illinois,129 Ohio,130 New 
York,131 West Virginia,132 and the federal government.133 
Other jurisdictions expressly limit or direct the mechanisms of 
judicial relief.  Louisiana provides that all claims must be filed in 
one district court,134 while Maine and Massachusetts provide that 
118. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.101(a) (West 2011) repealed by 
2009 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 180 § 12(2) (West). 
119. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 775.05(2) (West 2009). 
120. See id. 
121. ALA. CODE § 29-2-158 (LexisNexis 2003). 
122. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4904 (West 2011). 
123. MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 10-501(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2009). 
124. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-B:13 (2007). 
125. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-84 (2009). 
126. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 156 (West 2008). 
127. TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-108 (Supp. 2011). 
128. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.11(B) (2007 & Supp. 2011). 
129. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/8(c) (West 2007 & Supp. 2011). 
130. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(B) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011). 
131. N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 2011). 
132. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a (LexisNexis 2009). 
133. 28 U.S.C. § 2513 (2006). 
134. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8(C)(1) (Supp. 2011), amended by 2011 La. 
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the superior court shall have original jurisdiction over claims for 
wrongful imprisonment.135  New Jersey states that suits for damages 
for wrongful conviction may be brought in the superior court 
against the Department of the Treasury.136  Iowa permits tort claims 
to be filed in a district court subject to prior negotiation by a state 
appeal board.137 
b. Suggested approach for proposed statute 
Given the variety of judicial and administrative mechanisms 
for receiving compensation among the various jurisdictions, the 
proposed statute, rather than electing any specific mechanism, pro­
vides that compensation claims shall be brought in the appropriate 
forum for claims against the state as determined by state law.138 
The statute includes sections for both judicial and administrative 
relief, allowing each jurisdiction to choose the appropriate forum. 
This approach not only avoids general confusion regarding the ap­
plication of the statute, but also respects traditional state judicial-
governance prerogatives.  It is also consistent with the procedural 
reality that the compensation action is against the state.  Further, 
federal courts have tended to honor state-prescribed compensation 
procedures and have not hesitated to dismiss improperly filed 
suits.139 
2. Statute of Limitations 
a. Statutory survey 
Many compensation statutes provide a statute of limitations for 
bringing compensation actions.  This period generally begins to run 
when the wrongfully imprisoned convicted person is exonerated or 
135. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8243 (2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258D, § 3 
(2010). 
136. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-2 (West 2009); see also Dorsett v. N.J. State Police, 
04 CV 5652, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10512, at *17 (D.N.J. Feb. 15, 2007) (dismissing 
claim “for failure to file in the proper forum and failure to name the Department of 
Treasury as a defendant”); Wilson v. N.J. State Police, 04 CV 1523 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 60514, at *31-32, 35 (D.N.J. Aug. 15, 2006) (refusing to extend supplemental 
pendent jurisdiction over an improperly filed claim, despite appeals “[i]n the interests 
of judicial efficiency,” where “the State ha[d] not waived its sovereign immunity to be 
sued under this statute in federal court”). 
137. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 663A.1(5), 669.3, 669.4, 669.5 (West 1998). 
138. Bernhard suggests that “[e]xisting forums” can handle compensation claims 
“expeditiously” given the relatively small number of cases that will arise in any year. 
See Bernhard I, supra note 35, at 109.  “Furthermore the legal issues arising are neither 
so technical nor so unique as to justify creation of a specialized agency.” Id. 
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released from prison.  Two years is the most common limitation, 
having been adopted by ten states: Alabama,140 Illinois,141 Iowa,142 
Louisiana,143 Maine,144 Massachusetts,145 Ohio,146 New Jersey,147 
New York,148 and West Virginia.149 
A claim must be filed within five years in North Carolina;150 
three years in New Hampshire151 and Texas;152 one year in Tennes­
see;153 and two years in California.154  Montana accepts applications 
for educational assistance within ten years following exoneration, 
but limits aid to five years within this ten-year period.155  No time 
limitation is expressed in the compensation statutes of five jurisdic­
tions: Maryland, Oklahoma, Virginia, Wisconsin, and the District of 
Columbia. 
b. Suggested approach for proposed statute 
In accord with the approach taken by the Innocence Project in 
its proposed statute, the statute proposed herein adopts a three-
year statute of limitations.156 The statute of limitations begins to 
run when the claimant is found actually innocent of the crime of 
wrongful conviction and imprisonment, whether by executive par­
don157 or judicial determination.158  This means that the limitations 
period contained in the proposed statute applies only with respect 
to the damages phase of a compensation claim. Thus, if a convic­
tion were reversed on procedural rather than factual grounds,159 the 
140. ALA. CODE § 29-2-162 (LexisNexis 2003). 
141. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/22(c) (West 2007 & Supp. 2011). 
142. IOWA CODE ANN. § 663A.1(8) (West 1998). 
143. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8(D) (Supp. 2011). 
144. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8244 (2003). 
145. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258D § 8 (2010). 
146. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(H) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011). 
147. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-4 (West 2009). 
148. N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(7) (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 2011). 
149. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a(h) (LexisNexis 2009). 
150. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-82 (2009). 
151. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-B:14(IV) (2007). 
152. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.003 (West 2011). 
153. TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-108(a)(7)(F) (Supp. 2011). 
154. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4901 (West 2011). 
155. MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-1-214(4) (2009). 
156. See Innocence Project: Model Statute, supra note 35, § 6.  Additionally, the 
proposed statute provides that, “[p]ersons convicted, incarcerated and released from 
custody prior to the effective date of this Act shall commence an action under this Act 
within three years of said effective date.” Id. 
157. See supra Part II.B.5.b. 
158. See supra Part II.B.5.b. 
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statute of limitations would not yet become applicable.  It would 
begin to run when the person is declared factually innocent in a 
later judicial proceeding. 
Questions regarding time constraints in seeking or applying for 
executive or judicial determinations of actual innocence are beyond 
the scope of the proposed statute.  Over two-fifths of compensation 
jurisdictions, as well as other proposed statutes, have determined 
that a two-year timeframe is sufficient for one to present a claim of 
wrongful conviction and imprisonment.160  A period greater than 
two years is preferable due to practical and equitable considera­
tions.  Reintegration into society often delays and disrupts the pro­
cess of retaining counsel and formulating a legal claim.  One 
concern is that upon release from prison most exonerees are preoc­
cupied with reorienting their lives.161  Before starting to navigate 
the relatively complex compensation process, a claimant should be 
given adequate time to readjust to life outside of prison.  Addition­
ally, finding suitable legal counsel could take considerable time. 
These concerns may have been recognized by the Innocence Project 
and those jurisdictions with limitation periods of longer than two 
years.162 
There may be some merit in adopting a substantially longer 
statute of limitations.  But evidentiary and administration consider­
ations militate against that approach. The compensation schemes 
of New York, New Jersey, and West Virginia, although employing 
the two year alternative, support this assertion. These statutes pro­
vide, in their preliminary findings, that when determining actual in­
nocence, “due consideration” is to be given “to difficulties of 
proof” beyond the control of the claimant, including the “passage 
of time” and “death or unavailability of witnesses.”163  Read to­
gether, the statute of limitations and preliminary findings represent 
a legislative determination that although traditional evidentiary re­
quirements should be relaxed, problems of proof would become too 
difficult to overcome if compensation actions could be initiated in­
definitely after exoneration.  A statute of limitations of three years 
160. ABA Report, supra note 35, at 2 (stating that the two-year timeframe ap­
plies if a notice requirement is not fulfilled); Arizona State Law Journal: Model Act, 
supra note 35, at 712; see also Bernhard I, supra note 35 (describing two years as 
“reasonable”). 
161. See infra note 203. 
162. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 






      05/09/2012   13:22:53
31827-wne_34-1 Sheet No. 19 Side A      05/09/2012   13:22:53
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\34-1\WNE101.txt unknown Seq: 29  9-MAY-12 10:14
 
 
2012] A PROPOSAL: COMPENSATION FOR WRONGFUL IMPRISONMENT 29 
will help avoid evidentiary problems while preserving judicial and 
administrative resources. 
States should also consider extending the limitations period in 
at least some cases to avoid unfairness. These include cases in 
which the claimant is delayed in bringing the claim because of 
health problems, a mental disability, an extreme hardship, or other 
justifiable reasons.  Courts and agencies may also apply traditional 
equitable exceptions when it is practically impossible for the claim­
ant to meet the statute of limitations.  But an explicit exception for 
special circumstances will better ensure that wrongfully convicted 
and imprisoned persons are not deprived of a realistic opportunity 
to obtain reasonable compensation. 
D. Calculation of the Award 
In many jurisdictions monetary losses relating to wrongful im­
prisonment, as well as less tangible factors, may be considered in 
determining the appropriate award.  The proposed statute follows 
the latter approach, allowing consideration of a range of factors, but 
leaving it up to the enacting jurisdiction to determine the eviden­
tiary burden in establishing damages. 
1. Prescribed Criteria and Discretionary Considerations 
a. Statutory survey 
In those states that offer compensation to wrongfully impris­
oned persons, there is great variation with respect to how to deter­
mine the amount of the award.  Most compensation schemes fall 
into one or more of the following categories. They (1) prescribe or 
limit the amount awardable for each year of incarceration or specify 
precisely which losses are recoverable; (2) limit the total possible 
award; (3) provide a list of factors that may be considered, such as 
lost income; (4) offer great deference to courts or claim boards in 
determining the appropriate amount; or (5) authorize payment for 
medical, educational, or other services.  Others merely affirm the 
availability of an action for damages. 
A few statutes do not place caps on the total amount recover­
able, but instead limit the amount awardable for each year or day of 
incarceration, or in some other fashion.  Alabama’s statute allots 
$50,000 for each year of incarceration and additional compensation 
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Incarceration.164  In California, the claimant must establish “pecu­
niary injury” before the board, which then recommends that the 
legislature appropriate a sum of $100 per day of incarceration 
served subsequent to the claimant’s conviction.165  New Jersey pro­
vides that damages for mistaken imprisonment “shall not exceed 
twice the amount of the claimant’s income in the year prior to his 
incarceration or $20,000.00 for each year of incarceration, which­
ever is greater” and “reasonable attorney fees.”166  Under federal 
law, the United States Court of Federal Claims may award damages 
up to $100,000 per year for any plaintiff sentenced to death, and 
$50,000 per year for any other plaintiff.167 
For statutes that link compensation to the duration of wrongful 
imprisonment, the award is more commonly subject to a maximum 
total recovery.  North Carolina enables the Industrial Commis­
sioner to award a claimant $50,000 for each year of imprisonment, 
up to a maximum of $750,000.168  Texas entitles the claimant to 
$80,000 multiplied by the number of years of incarceration, if the 
time served is less than 20 years, or $500,000 if the time served is 
twenty years or more.169  Illinois has the following maximums: 
$85,350 for up to five years of imprisonment, $170,000 for five to 
fourteen years of imprisonment, and $199,150 for more than four­
164. ALA. CODE § 29-2-159 (LexisNexis 2003); see also Bernhard II, supra note 
35, at 705 (referring to this statute as one of the few “generous compensation systems”). 
As with this statute, the other statutes that link compensation to the length of incarcera­
tion do so on a pro rata basis.  For brevity purposes, this fact will be omitted hereafter 
when describing these statutes. 
165. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4904 (West 2011). 
166. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-5 (West 2009). 
167. 28 U.S.C. 2513(e) (2006); John G. Browning, Legally Speaking: Compensat­
ing the Exonerated, SOUTHEAST  TEX. REC. (Nov. 28, 2007, 9:30 AM), http://www. 
setexasrecord.com/arguments/204519-legally-speaking-compensating-the-exonerated 
(noting the “surprising[ ]” generosity of Uncle Sam when it comes to compensation). 
168. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-84 (2009). 
169. See  TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE  ANN. § 103.052 (West 2011). A prior 
version of the Texas statute that awarded only $25,000 per year came “under fire” for 
the “[relatively low] amount it provide[d].”  Browning, supra note 167.  An attorney for 
the West Texas Innocence Project pointed out that the available compensation at that 
time was “a joke.  I don’t know of anybody who says ‘I’ll go to prison for 20 years of my 
life if you’ll give $25,000 [a year] at the end of it.’” Id. (alteration in original); see also 
David Ellison, Ex-con Fights for Bill to Help the Wrongly Convicted, HOUS. CHRON., 
Sep. 6, 2006, at B1, available at http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Ex­
con-fights-for-bill-to-help-the-wrongly-1861447.php (Following a ten-year prison stay 
for a wrongful rape conviction, Anthony Robinson earned a law degree from a law 
school in Texas.  He is described by a state senator as the “poster child for why we need 
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teen years of imprisonment.170  Louisiana limits recovery to $25,000 
per year of incarceration, not to exceed $250,000; the district court, 
if it is “reasonable and appropriate,” may also “order payment” for 
job-skills training, medical and counseling services, and tuition and 
fees at community colleges and units of the state university.171  Wis­
consin provides that “the claims board shall find the amount which 
will equitably compensate [a claimant], not to exceed $25,000 and at 
a rate . . . not greater than $5,000 per year.”172 
Three statutes do not base compensation directly on the length 
of incarceration, but still limit total possible recovery.  Oklahoma 
limits total recovery to $175,000.173  Maine imposes a limit of 
$300,000 for all claims, including court costs and interest.174  In New 
Hampshire, the claimant may receive up to $20,000 and, at the dis­
cretion of the board of claims, may also receive attorneys’ fees.175 
Other states employ more complicated calculation schemes. 
The Iowa statute provides that damages recoverable by a wrong­
fully imprisoned person are limited to restitution for fines, 
surcharges, penalties, court costs, reasonable attorneys’ fees for 
criminal proceedings, appeals, and costs of any civil actions or post-
conviction proceedings, and actions for compensation.176  Liqui­
dated damages are limited to $50 per day of wrongful imprisonment 
and lost wages or earned income up to $25,000 per year.177 
In Ohio, a wrongfully imprisoned individual may recover fines, 
court costs, and reasonable attorneys’ fees related to all criminal 
170. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/8(c) (West Supp. 2011). Under this statute, 
attorneys’ fees may not exceed 25% of the award granted, and costs of living adjust­
ments may not exceed 5%. See id. 
171. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8(H)(2) (Supp. 2011), amended by 2011 La. 
Sess. Law Serv. Act 262 (H.B. 285) (West); see also In re Williams, No. 538401, 2007 
WL 4792141 (La. Dist. Ct. May 25, 2007), judgment vacated by In re Williams, 984 So.2d 
789 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (awarding statutory maximum plus “One Thousand dollars . . . 
for payment of tuition, books and other materials necessary for job skill training at the 
Louisiana Technical College, . . . as well as . . . Five Thousand dollars . . . for medical 
and counseling services . . . calculated at the rate of . . . $90 for each . . . weekly visit up 
to a maximum of 3 years”). 
172. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 775.05(4) (West 2009).  Compensation shall include “at­
torney fees, costs and disbursements.” Id. If the claims board finds that a larger 
amount is necessary it must submit a report specifying the amount to each house of the 
legislature. Id. 
173. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 154(B)(4) (West 2008). 
174. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8242 (2003). 
175. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 541-B:14, -B:18 (2007). 
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32 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1 
proceedings, appeals, and the action to be released from prison.178 
Damages are limited to $43,300 for each year of incarceration, sub­
ject to adjustment by the state auditor and any loss of wages or 
income that directly resulted from wrongful arrest, prosecution, 
conviction and imprisonment.179  The statute also permits the state 
to seek reimbursement for costs from the individual for services at 
the detention facility, including sick calls and fees related to hous­
ing, feeding, and supervision.180 
Massachusetts permits recovery up to $500,000 for lost income, 
the length and conditions of incarceration, and any other injuries.181 
The court may also direct the Commonwealth to provide services to 
address any deficiencies in the claimant’s physical and emotional 
condition caused by the wrongful imprisonment and to permit the 
claimant to receive educational services from any state or commu­
nity college at 50% of the cost.182 
Virginia authorizes the Comptroller, with the approval of the 
General Assembly, to award compensation equal to ninety percent 
of the Commonwealth’s per capita income, for each year of incar­
ceration up to twenty years.183  The award may be divided into an 
initial payment of 20 percent, and an annuity for the remaining 80 
percent.184  The claimant is also eligible to receive a tuition assis­
tance grant of $15,000, which is deducted from the total award, and 
reimbursement up to $10,000 for tuition, career, and technical train­
ing in a Virginia community college contingent upon successful 
completion of the training.185  Montana offers only educational aid, 
and only to the wrongfully convicted who were exonerated based 
on the results of post-conviction forensic DNA testing.186  This aid 
may cover tuition and related expenses for any community college, 
178. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2743.48(E)(2)(a)-(d) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011). 
179. Id. 
180. Id. 
181. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258D § 5 (2008). 
182. Id. 
183. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.11 (2007 & Supp. 2011). 
184. Id.  Bernhard refers to this as an example of a “cynical, protective statute[ ]” 
that does “not reflect public opinion as expressed by the media, and [is] inconsistent 
with other progressive reform efforts motivated by exonerations across the country.” 
See Bernhard II, supra note 35, at 706. 
185. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.11. 
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state college, or tribally controlled community college for any 
person.187 
Some state statutes afford substantial deference to courts or 
claims boards in assessing the amount of compensation. The New 
York and West Virginia statutes, for example, provide that if a 
claimant is entitled to judgment, damages shall be awarded in an 
amount that the court determines will fairly and reasonably com­
pensate him.188  Judicial deference is also important in the District 
of Columbia Code, which states without further qualification that 
the judge may award damages upon a finding of unjust imprison­
187. Id.  Compensation under this statute does not extend beyond this type of 
assistance. See Bernhard II, supra note 35, at 706 (referring to the benefits under this 
statute as “symbolic token support”). 
188. See N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(6) (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 2011); W. VA. 
CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a(g) (LexisNexis 2009); see also Bernhard II, supra note 35, at 710 
(promoting compensation statutes for their facility in resolving disputes, citing New 
York’s as a prime example).  Bernhard recounts the compensation suit of Larry David 
Holdren, who was wrongfully imprisoned in West Virginia for fourteen years: 
Simply by reading Holdren’s uncontested petition, the West Virginia Court of 
Claims concluded the state was liable for the wrongful conviction. Turning to 
damages, the court pointed out that Mr. Holdren had spent fifteen years in 
prison and had been enrolled in an undergraduate university program at the 
time of his arrest.  The court heard an economist estimate what Mr. Holdren 
might have been expected to earn during the fifteen years if his career plans 
had progressed uninterrupted.  The court considered the claimant’s “impair­
ment of future earnings . . . , as well as the loss of reputation, the loss of 
liberty, emotional stress, pain and suffering, and the reputation of the particu­
lar facility in which the claimant was imprisoned in determining the amount of 
the award.”  Finally, the court recognized that the claimant had already par­
tially recovered through a civil action against a third party and took that into 
consideration in estimating damages.  In a two-and-one-half-page decision, the 
court determined that the claimant was entitled to an award of $ 1,650,000, 
approximately $110,000 for each year spent in prison. 
Although some might complain that the award was too low, the claimant 
recovered relatively quickly and without having to finance complicated litiga­
tion.  He was not required to obtain a pardon, which might have been impossi­
ble.  Finally, the damages, while not copious, were sufficient to permit Mr. 
Holdren to complete school, purchase a home, or invest in a business should 
he so desire—activities he certainly would have enjoyed had he not been 
falsely accused and imprisoned.  The award could finance the psychological 
therapy so many of the exonerated need. The award provided a foundation 
upon which to begin to build a life. 
Bernhard II, supra note 35, at 709-10 (alteration original) (citations omitted) (citing 
Holdren v. State, No. CC-00-461 (W. Va. Ct. Cl. Apr. 2, 2002)). 
Another statute worth noting here is that of Wisconsin.  The statute describes the 
standard for determining compensation as “equitabl[e],” but such characterization is 
questionable given the stringent limits on recovery and difficulty of transcending those 
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34 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1 
ment.189  The board of claims in Tennessee also has considerable 
leeway in determining compensation: it may consider all relevant 
factors, including, but not limited to, the person’s physical and 
mental suffering and loss of earnings, but may not grant an award in 
excess of $1,000,000.190  The Maryland statute, which calls for an 
amount commensurate with the actual damages sustained by the 
claimant, and a reasonable amount for any financial or other appro­
priate counseling for the individual due to the confinement, pro­
vides more guided deference, though no cap on recovery.191 
Texas is the only state which provides the exoneree with 
monthly annuity payments for the duration of the exoneree’s life.192 
These payments are based on a present value sum equal to the total 
amount of the award and “on a five percent per annum interest rate 
and other actuarial factors within the discretion of the comptrol­
ler.”193  The applicant is not permitted to “sell, mortgage or other­
wise encumber, or anticipate the payments, wholly or partly, by 
assignment or otherwise.”194 
Some statutes introduce other conditions regarding recovery. 
Four jurisdictions expressly prohibit the awarding of punitive dam­
ages: Maine,195 Massachusetts,196 Oklahoma,197 and the District of 
Columbia.198 
Alabama, Iowa, Louisiana, and Ohio do not allow compensa­
tion awards to be reduced by expenses incurred by the state relating 
to the arrest, prosecution, and imprisonment of the individual (in­
189. D.C. CODE § 2-423 (LexisNexis 2008). 
190. TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-108(a)(7) (Supp. 2011).  This statute was enacted in 
response to the case of Clark McMillan, who was exonerated by DNA evidence after 
“serv[ing] twenty-two and a half years for a crime that he did not commit” and who, 
as a result of his wrongful conviction, . . . sustained the following injuries: pain 
and suffering; severe mental anguish; emotional distress; loss of income; inflic­
tion of physical illness; inadequate medical care; humiliation, indignities, and 
embarrassment; degradation; injury to reputation; permanent loss of natural 
psychological development; and McMillan also endured restrictions on his lib­
erty and all forms of personal freedom, such as diet, sleep, personal contact, 
educational opportunity, vocational opportunity, athletic opportunity, per­
sonal fulfillment, sexual activity, family relations, reading, television, movies, 
travel, enjoyment, and expression. 
2004 Tenn. Pub. Acts Ch. 880 at 2. 
191. MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 10-501(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2009). 
192. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.053(a) (West 2011). 
193. Id. § 103.053(b). 
194. Id. § 103.053(c). 
195. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8242 (2003). 
196. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258D § 5(A) (2008). 
197. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 154(C) (West 2008). 
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cluding the costs of food, clothing, shelter, and medical care).199 
The Massachusetts statute contains a similar provision. It further 
directs that the award not be offset by the value in reduction in 
tuition and fees for educational services or the value of services 
provided to the claimant as part of the award.200 
b. Suggested approach for proposed statute 
The proposed statute provides for fair and just compensation 
of the wrongfully imprisoned individual and payment for reasona­
ble and necessary services.  In awarding compensation, the review­
ing court or agency is to consider the following non-exhaustive list 
of factors to the extent it considers relevant: (1) costs incurred, in­
cluding attorneys’ fees (where the attorney has not been paid to 
represent the exoneree, such as a legal aid or public defender attor­
ney compensated by the state), in connection with criminal and civil 
proceedings relating to the wrongful conviction and imprisonment, 
including the action to obtain compensation;201 (2) the conditions of 
incarceration, including, but not limited to, any physical and mental 
suffering caused by imprisonment; (3) loss of wages or salary that 
directly resulted from the arrest, prosecution, conviction, and 
wrongful imprisonment;202 and (4) fees expended by the claimant 
for medical care, housing, supervision, and other services rendered 
while imprisoned. 
Additionally, the state may be ordered to provide medical and 
mental health services for conditions related to the wrongful impris­
onment; without showing this link, the claimant may request free 
counseling from the state department of mental health or its 
equivalent.203  The claimant is entitled to receive educational assis­
199. See ALA. CODE § 29-2-160 (LexisNexis 2003); IOWA CODE ANN. § 663A.1(7) 
(West 1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8(H)(c)(3) (Supp. 2011), amended by 2011 
La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 262 (H.B. 285) (West); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(F)(1) 
(West 2006 & Supp. 2011). 
200. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258D § 5(B) (2008). 
201. See Arizona State Law Journal: Model Act, supra note 35, at 711 (providing 
for “reasonable attorney’s fees” as part of “compensatory damages”). 
202. Although no compensation statute has an offset for windfall profits to a ce­
lebrity inmate, and neither does the proposed statute, an enacting state may want to 
consider including one.  Such a provision would call for the reduction of any award by 
the amount the claimant has profited from wrongful conviction and which the inmate 
would not have earned in the event of an (earlier) acquittal or dismissal. Yet this type 
of situation is a rarity, and one that could be dealt with adequately under the “fair” and 
“reasonable” standard of the proposed statute, as currently written. 
203. See Santos & Roberts, supra note 79 (discussing the necessity of providing 
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tance, including payment for tuition and related expenses at a state 
or community college, and may elect to receive one year of job-
skills training at the state’s expense.204  Finally, the compensation 
award may not be offset by any expenses assumed by the state in 
connection with the arrest, prosecution, and imprisonment of the 
exoneree.205 
The statute does not place limits on compensation, and this 
may raise an objection to enactment.206  However, punitive or ex­
emplary damages are not recoverable. The “lost opportunity costs” 
of wrongful imprisonment are tremendous and may well amount to 
the destruction of a person’s livelihood, physical and emotional 
well-being, and personal relationships.207  Putting an artificial cap 
an innocent person comes out of prison, they are not equipped with the tools to reinte­
grate into society, and that’s something that money alone can’t solve,” a New Jersey 
state representative explained. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). This represen­
tative “introduced a bill to set aside $1.25 million a year for programs for exonerated 
prisoners.” Id.  Meanwhile, “[i]n New York, a bill has been drafted that would allow 
the wrongly convicted to receive services from agencies that already serve other needy 
populations, such as families on welfare.” Id.; see also Shawn Armbrust, When Money 
Isn’t Enough: The Case for Holistic Compensation of the Wrongfully Convicted, 41 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 157, 181 (2004) (“Because the problems exonerated individuals face 
upon release are not easily calculable, it is important to provide resources for job train­
ing and health care to ensure that the wrongfully convicted are fully compensated for 
the problems their loss of liberty has created.”). 
204. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
205. See ABA Report, supra note 35, at 9 (advocating for a similar provision). 
206. Cf. Santos & Roberts, supra note 79 (stating that, in response to a proposed 
compensation bill in Pennsylvania, a state representative asked, “Once you open up 
those floodgates, where do you get all the money to pay for these falsely charged peo­
ple? . . . How much money is it going to require?  How much is a person worth?”). 
207. See Browning, supra note 167 (illustrating the inadequacies of the Texas 
compensation statute by citing the case of Greg Wallis, who could only recover $25,000 
for each of the fifteen years he served for a wrongful rape conviction).  According to 
Browning, 
Besides the emotional and psychological toll taken by years behind bars, indi­
viduals like Greg Wallis [who was exonerated by DNA evidence in 2006 after 
serving over fifteen years for a wrongful conviction of rape] have to cope with 
the economic realities of a career interrupted and a return to the 
workforce. . . . 
Think about it.  You’ve been convicted for a crime you know you didn’t 
commit.  You’ve been plucked from family and friends and thrown into a 
human cesspool for years as you struggle to survive the grim realities of prison 
life-gang violence, murder, rape and degradation. 
Then, if you’ve been among the fortunate few to have been vindicated by 
genetic testing, you’re released into a world that in many ways you don’t rec­
ognize.  As you struggle to adjust and get your life back, how much do you 
think each year that’s been stolen from you is worth? 
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on compensation could lead to something less than a truly compre­
hensive remedy.208  Of course, a wrongfully imprisoned person will 
never truly be made fully whole.209  The individual can only be 
fairly and reasonably compensated in light of potentially quantifi­
able factors.210 
The term “reasonable,” in particular, connotes that the judge 
or agency must proceed with an eye towards the preservation of 
Id. 
208. See id.; Bernhard I, supra note 35, at 105-07 (discussing how “unreasonable 
limitations [on awards have] discourage[d] claim filings” in several states and also have 
discouraged lawyers from taking up these cases); see also ABA Report, supra note 35, 
at 7 (suggesting that if any cap is enacted, it should correspond with “other existing caps 
in the jurisdiction, such as those for medical malpractice or other tort claims”); Arizona 
State Law Journal: Model Act, supra note 35, at 711 (“The court shall compensate the 
claimant for proven losses without limitation as to amount,” but “may not award exem­
plary damages.”). 
209. In some sense, “the wrongly convicted may actually suffer a loss greater than 
death.”  Santos & Roberts, supra note 79 (paraphrasing “Stan V. Smith, a forensic 
economist and expert on compensation for loss of life”); see also Ellison, supra note 169 
(quoting Anthony Robinson, exoneree, explaining how “it’s just sad that people don’t 
realize that even if you gave them a million dollars a year, the injury goes beyond what 
the compensation can possibly give to make up for it”).  Despite physical freedom, an 
exonerated person may experience daily the “nightmare” of the wrongful imprison­
ment.  Santos & Roberts, supra note 79 (quoting Darryl Hunt who was exonerated in 
North Carolina after serving 18 years for murder). That an exonerated person will for­
ever “battl[e] deep emotional scars,” id., regardless of compensation, does not mean 
that such a person should be denied a comprehensive remedy in terms of both a finan­
cial award and the provision of health and other services. As the New York Court of 
Claims put it: 
The claimant has been humiliated, degraded, shamed and suffered a loss of 
reputation and earnings.  For this he must be paid, and for this money dam­
ages can be compensatory.  But all the wealth of the State of New York could 
not compensate the claimant for the mental anguish suffered through nearly 
twelve years of false imprisonment, under the impression that he would be 
there for the rest of his life.  How can a man be repaid who has been branded 
a murderer and whose only hope is an early death to release him from the 
sentence erroneously passed on him?  For this, any award is bound to be a 
mere token, but it should compensate as well as the medium allows. 
Hoffner v. State, 142 N.Y.S.2d 630, 631-32 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1955) (awarding over one hun­
dred thousand dollars); see also Bernhard I, supra note 35, at 107 (discussing McLaugh­
lin v. State, No. 75123 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. Oct. 16, 1989), where the court awarded $1.5 million 
for various non-pecuniary injuries, including “loss of liberty [for over six years of 
wrongful imprisonment], mental stress anguish and reputation”). 
210. Dedication of resources to reentry and discharge planning is an important, 
and an increasingly necessary element of rehabilitating all former inmates, exonerated 
or otherwise.  The need to curb future criminal activity should be treated as a para­
mount goal.  Recognizing that the innocent inmate, while innocent, has nonetheless 
been exposed to a prison environment, the proposed statute contemplates that exoner­
ated inmates will be afforded the full benefits of reentry planning (such as career train­
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38 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1 
public resources.211  However, it is worth noting that even in states 
that do provide statutory access to compensation for wrongful im­
prisonment, the number and quantity of awards has been minimal. 
In New York, of the more than 200 wrongful conviction claims 
heard by the New York Court of Claims in the past two decades, 
there were over 150 dismissals, 19 out-of-court settlements, and 
only 12 actual awards.  The twelve exonerees received an average 
of just $457,000 per case.212  Similarly, in Wisconsin there have been 
only two successful claims in the last 55 years, while only one claim 
has been paid as the result of Texas’s compensation statute.213  The 
value, in terms of preserving limited state resources, of placing an 
artificial cap on awards for wrongful imprisonments is therefore 
questionable.214  Further, states save substantial resources by re­
leasing wrongfully convicted individuals, as imprisonment costs at 
least $20,000 per year for each inmate, and escalating.215  On bal­
ance, the state will not be unduly burdened if no cap on compensa­
tion is incorporated. 
211. This point is illustrated by New York’s compensation statute, which, like the 
proposed statute, does not limit damages. N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(6) (McKinney 1989 
& Supp. 2011).  The New York statute appears to grant judges even greater deference 
in determining the award. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.  Still, in New 
York, a state with one of the highest levels of exonerations, “the cost of compensating 
deserving individuals has been minimal.”  Bernhard II, supra note 35, at 715. 
212. Bernhard II, supra note 35, at 715-16. 
213. Bernhard I, supra note 35, at 106-07. 
214. See id. at 106 (noting that “[t]he number of wrongful convictions occurring in 
any state is simply not great enough to” justify severe restrictions on the amount 
recoverable). 
215.	 As explained in the Chicago Sun Times, 
Considering the costs borne by taxpayers for criminal court buildings, 
court clerk staff, judges, prosecutors, police officers and prisons, larger pay­
ments to the wrongfully convicted would represent a mere drop in the bucket. 
Such statutory compensation should be swift and meaningful. The U.S. 
government pays up to $50,000 per year for persons wrongfully convicted of 
non-capital federal crimes (and more for those who landed on Death Row). 
Ohio awards $40,300 per year plus lost income.  California provides $100 per 
day, or $35,200 per year. 
Sound like a lot?  Consider this: The cost of housing a prison inmate is 
about $20,000 per year.  Assuming Michael would have lived another 30 years 
or so in prison, the State of Illinois actually saved $600,000 by his release. 
Karen Daniel, Editorial, Wrongfully Convicted People Get Pittance for Years in Prison, 
CHI. SUN TIMES, Aug. 11, 2006, at 41; see also CHRISTOPHER REINHART, COST OF IN­
CARCERATION AND  COST OF A  CAREER  CRIMINAL, Conn. Office of Legislative Re­
search, Doc. No. 2008-R-0099 (2008), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2008/rpt/2008­
R-0099.htm (stating that “the annual cost to incarcerate an inmate in . . . Connecticut in 
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2012] A PROPOSAL: COMPENSATION FOR WRONGFUL IMPRISONMENT 39 
Under the proposed statute, the awarding authority in its dis­
cretion may direct payment of compensation in lump sum, install­
ments, or following Texas’s lead, in annuity payments216 as it deems 
appropriate.  Upon release from prison, many exonerees lack the 
experience to manage personal finances. The annuity payments are 
a way to guarantee that exonerees will receive some support for the 
rest of their lives.217  The payments will be based on a present value 
sum equal to the total amount of the award and on market interest 
rate per annum and other actuarial factors within the discretion of 
the jurisdiction’s awarding entity.  The annuity payments may not 
be accelerated, deferred, increased, or decreased. The applicant 
may not sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber, or anticipate the 
payments, wholly or partly, by assignment or otherwise.  In deter­
mining whether to commute the compensation to a lump sum pay­
ment, the awarding authority must consider whether there exists 
special needs warranting such payment, whether it will be in the 
best interests of the individual and whether that individual has the 
ability to wisely manage and control the commuted award irrespec­
tive of whether there exist special needs.218 
2. The Burden of Proof in Demonstrating Damages 
a. Statutory survey 
A majority of the jurisdictions that recognize judicial exonera­
tions require “clear and convincing” evidence of innocence. The 
burden of proof is less clear for establishing the appropriate amount 
of compensation in jurisdictions that do not limit an individual to a 
fixed amount per year of incarceration.  Although it is difficult to 
categorize the relevant statutes, two general trends are observable: 
(1) conventional evidentiary requirements are relaxed; and (2) stan­
dards of fairness and reasonableness in determining appropriate 
damages are employed.  But these formulations provide little direct 
guidance about the rigor or thoroughness with which damages must 
be established.219  In the absence of an express burden of proof, the 
216. See  TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.053 (West 2011). 
217. Jeff Carlton, Texas DNA Exonerees Find Prosperity After Prison, ASSOC. 
PRESS, Sept. 4, 2009, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/8691540 
(“The monthly payments are expected to be a lifeline for exonerees such as Wiley 
Fountain, 53, who received nearly $390,000 in compensation . . . but squandered it by, as 
he said, ‘living large.’  He ended up homeless, spending his nights in a tattered sleeping 
bag behind a liquor store.”). 
218. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-108(a)(7)(D) (Supp. 2011). 
219. One statute expressly includes a burden of proof. See infra notes 222-224 
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40 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1 
requisite standard presumably would be based on some default as 
determined by state law (whether statute, regulation, or case law). 
But it seems appropriate to apply the requisite standard of proof, 
whatever it may be, in a manner consistent with the above de­
scribed trends, so as to not vitiate the meaningful remedy intended 
by these statutes.220 
Some statutes follow both trends. Under New York’s statute, 
the court, upon “find[ing] that the claimant is entitled to a judg­
ment, . . . shall award damages in such sum of money as the court 
determines will fairly and reasonably compensate him.”221  The 
West Virginia statute contains a similar provision.222  The legislative 
findings in these statutes require courts to “give due consideration” 
to evidentiary shortcomings in the “interest of justice” when evalu­
ating compensation claims. 223  In like manner, under the Louisiana 
statute, in making its determination on actual innocence and com­
pensation, “[t]he court may consider any relevant evidence regard­
less of whether it was admissible in, or excluded from, the criminal 
trial in which the applicant was convicted.”224  Through fixing 
awards on a temporal basis, the court is to further “order payment” 
for medical care, job training, and educational services as it “finds 
reasonable and appropriate.”225 
Several statutes of other states also speak in terms of reasona­
bleness or fairness, or provide the judge or agency at least some 
discretion in calculating the award. The Wisconsin claims board 
220. See supra Part II.A 
221. N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(6) (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 2011). 
222. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a(g) (LexisNexis 2009). 
223. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C (West 2009); see also W. VA. CODE  ANN. § 14-2­
13a(a).  Based on the surrounding text, this statement appears particularly geared to­
ward the burden of proving actual innocence.  But it seems pervaded by an equitable 
spirit “regarding the weight and admissibility of evidence” in general in compensation 
suits. Id.; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258D §§ 1(F), 5(A) (2008) (granting the trier 
of fact similar leeway in assessing evidence, and also stating that evidence should not be 
excluded on several federal or state constitutional grounds; provision appearing in the 
introductory section of the statute, which deals mostly with the threshold requirement 
of proving innocence, and not explicitly referring to the determination of damages; a 
later provision provides significant discretion in determining “fair[ ]” and “reason­
abl[e]” damages). 
224. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8(D) (Supp. 2011). 
225. Id. § 15:572.8(H), amended by 2011 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 262 (H.B. 285) 
(West); see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-B:10 (2007).  Under New Hampshire’s 
statute, the Board of Claims “shall not be bound by common law or statutory rules of 
evidence, but may admit all testimony having a reasonable probative value.” Id. § 541­
B:10(II).  When “the board by majority vote finds that payment to a claimant is justi­
fied,” “the governor shall draw [a] warrant for said payment out of any money in the 
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2012] A PROPOSAL: COMPENSATION FOR WRONGFUL IMPRISONMENT 41 
“shall find the amount which will equitably compensate the peti­
tioner, not to exceed $25,000.”226  Tennessee’s Board of Claims 
shall “consider[ ] . . . all factors . . . relevant including, but not lim­
ited to, the person’s physical and mental suffering and loss of earn­
ings.”227  Like Louisiana, Alabama has preconfigured award 
amounts but also provides a means for expanding the award: the 
Committee on Compensation for Wrongful Conviction may recom­
mend “additional compensation” as warranted “from the evi­
dence.” 228  The District of Columbia statute states, rather plainly, 
that “[u]pon a finding by the judge of unjust imprisonment . . . the 
judge may award damages.”229 
Other statutes refer to damages being equal or commensurate 
to losses actually incurred due to the wrongful conviction and im­
prisonment.  Under the Maryland statute, for example, the Board 
of Public Works may grant an individual “an amount commensu­
rate with the actual damages sustained by the individual.”230  In 
Ohio, a person is “irrebuttably presumed to be a wrongfully impris­
oned individual” for purposes of receiving compensation once the 
requisite judicial determination is received.231  The claimant must 
then present “requisite proof” of fines, attorneys’ fees, court costs, 
lost wages, and other losses to receive a sum of money equal to his 
or her damages.232 
Prior to the recent repeal of its statute, Texas was the only state 
which expressly provided a burden of proof in judicial proceedings 
for calculating the compensation award.233  Before the comptroller 
in an administrative proceeding,234 “[t]he petitioner must establish 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner is entitled to 
compensation and the amount of compensation to which petitioner is 
entitled.”235  Under this statute, the burden of proof was treated the 
226. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 775.05(4) (West 2009). But see supra note 188. 
227. TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-108(a)(7)(A) (Supp. 2011). 
228. ALA. CODE § 29-2-159(c) (LexisNexis 2003). 
229. D.C. CODE § 2-423 (LexisNexis 2008). 
230. MD. CODE  ANN., STATE  FIN. & PROC. § 10-501(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2009) 
(“[Board also] may grant a reasonable amount for any financial or other appropriate 
counseling for the individual, due to the confinement.”). 
231. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(E)(1) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011). 
232. Id. § 2743.48(E)(2). 
233. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN § 103.102 (West 2011), repealed by 2009 
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 180 § 12(2)7 (West). 
234. See Id. § 103.051(b)(2). 
235. Id. § 103.102, repealed by 2009 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 180 § 12(2)7 (West) 
(emphasis added); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 4904 (West 2011) (burden of proof not 
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42 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1 
same for the determination of innocence and calculation of 
compensation. 
b. Suggested approach for proposed statute 
As with the large majority of compensation statutes, the pro­
posed statute does not adopt a specific standard of proof in the 
compensation stage.  Instead the presumption is that the standard 
will be consistent with what is required in any judicial or adminis­
trative proceeding to recover damages from the state. This ap­
proach will avoid confusion about which standard to apply and will 
avoid having two evidentiary standards, one for innocent inmates 
and one for all other parties who claim they have been injured by 
the state.  The applicable standard should be construed so as to ef­
fectuate the remedial purpose of the statute: to provide fair and 
equitable awards to wrongfully imprisoned persons despite poten­
tial constraints in the presentation of evidence. 
E. Issuance of Declaration of Actual Innocence 
The proposed statute permits an individual whose conviction 
has been reversed to apply for the issuance of a declaration of ac­
tual innocence.  This will enable individuals whose convictions are 
reversed on procedural grounds to establish that they were actually 
innocent of the crime for which they were convicted and impris­
oned.  Many courts will not address the issue of innocence if there is 
a procedural ground to set aside the conviction.  A significant num­
ber of persons, for this reason, would be precluded from receiving 
compensation in the absence of this provision. This provision pro­
vides an effective cure to a potential deficiency in the technical 
exoneration. 
Actual innocence must be established by “clear and convincing 
evidence.”236  This standard is applicable to the “ordinary” judicial 
determination of actual innocence under the statute such as where a 
conviction is reversed because the individual, in fact, did not com­
mit the crime.237  A declaration of actual innocence satisfies the 
same procedural prerequisites as do other judicial exonerations (as 
well as executive pardons) based on actual innocence, and is func­
tionally equivalent for purposes of the statute. 
236. See supra Part II.B.5.b. 
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III. PROPOSED STATUTE 
As discussed in the previous section, twenty-four states, the 
District of Columbia, and the federal government have statutes 
governing compensation for individuals who are wrongfully impris­
oned.  Although some of these statutes are of recent origin, others 
were enacted more than twenty years ago.  Given the diversity of 
these statutes and the wealth of provisions governing every aspect 
of awarding compensation, a proposed statute should borrow from 
previously enacted statutes with modification necessary for fairness 
and to provide just compensation. 
The proposed statute contains alternate sections depending on 
whether a state decides to use a judicial or administrative determi­
nation of innocence.  The drafters of this article have concluded 
that each model has its own benefits. 




Section 1.  Legislative Findings 
The Legislature finds and declares that innocent individuals 
who have been wrongfully imprisoned have been frustrated in seek­
ing legal redress and that such individuals should have an available 
avenue of redress over and above the existing tort remedies to seek 
compensation for damages.  By enactment of the provisions of this 
chapter, the Legislature intends that those innocent individuals who 
can demonstrate that they were wrongfully imprisoned be able to 
recover damages against the State. 
1. Innocent individuals who were imprisoned but were not 
convicted have an avenue of redress under this Act over and 
above the existing tort remedies.238 
2. In light of the burden of proof that must be carried by such 
individuals, it is the intent of the Legislature that the courts, 
in exercising their discretion as permitted by law regarding 
the weight and admissibility of evidence submitted pursuant 
to this chapter, may, in the interest of justice, give due con­
sideration to difficulties of proof caused by the passage of 
time, the death or unavailability of witnesses, the destruc­
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44 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1 
tion of evidence or other factors not caused by such individ­
uals or those acting on their behalf.239 
Section 2.  Individuals Eligible for Relief 
An individual who meets all of the following criteria is eligible 
for relief under this Act: 
1. the individual has been wrongfully imprisoned for any crim­
inal offense contained in the laws of this state or any subdi­
vision thereof, and240 
2. the individual can prove that he or she is actually innocent 
of the criminal offense for which he or she was wrongfully 
imprisoned in the following manner: (i) in the case of a par­
don, a determination was made pursuant to law by the par­
don and parole board or by the governor that the offense 
for which the individual was imprisoned, including any 
lesser included offenses arising out of the same facts and 
circumstances, was not committed by the individual; or (ii) 
in the case of judicial relief, a court of competent jurisdic­
tion has issued a declaration of actual innocence pursuant to 
section 10 of this Act or has found by clear and convincing 
evidence that the offense for which the individual was im­
prisoned, including any such lesser included offenses, was 
not committed by the individual and issued an order vacat­
ing, dismissing, or reversing the charges or conviction and 
sentence and providing that no further proceedings can or 
will be held against the individual on any facts and circum­
stances alleged in the proceedings which had resulted in the 
imprisonment.241 
Section 3.  Exclusions from Eligibility 
An individual shall not be eligible to receive compensation 
under this chapter if such individual: 
1. was also serving a concurrent sentence for a crime not cov­
ered by this statute; provided, however, that this exception 
shall not apply to a claimant who would not have been in­
carcerated on the concurrent sentence but for the conviction 
covered by this statute; and provided further, that this exclu­
239. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-1 (West 2009); N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(1) (Mc-
Kinney 1989 & Supp. 2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a(a) (LexisNexis 2009). 
240. See D.C. CODE § 2-421 (LexisNexis 2008). 






      05/09/2012   13:22:53
31827-wne_34-1 Sheet No. 27 Side A      05/09/2012   13:22:53
C M
Y K





2012] A PROPOSAL: COMPENSATION FOR WRONGFUL IMPRISONMENT 45 
sion shall not apply to any period of incarceration due to the 
conviction covered by this statute that exceeds the term of 
imprisonment imposed on the claimant for the concurrent 
sentence, or if no such term was imposed by a court, the 
statutory maximum for the term of such concurrent 
sentence;242 
2. was the subject of an act of the legislature that authorized 
an award of compensation for his or her wrongful imprison­
ment and the individual has received the award;243 
3. by any act or omission related to the conduct of the alleged 
offense at the time and/or place of occurrence of the alleged 
offense, or by falsely giving an uncoerced confession of 
guilt, committing or suborning perjury, or fabricating evi­
dence, caused or brought about his or her wrongful 
imprisonment.244 
Section 4.  Jurisdiction.  [Judicial Relief] 
A civil action for damages under this chapter shall be brought 
in the court of claims [or in the superior court or district court] that 
has jurisdiction under the laws of this state to hear actions for dam­
ages against the state.  Such actions shall be governed by the rules 
of civil procedure applicable to such proceedings, except as other­
wise provided by this chapter.245 
Alt. Section 4.  Jurisdiction  [Administrative Relief] 
A proceeding for compensation under this chapter shall be 
brought before the board of claims [or administrative body] that 
has jurisdiction under the laws of this state to hear claims against 
the state and shall be governed by the rules of administrative proce­
dure applicable to such proceedings,246 except as otherwise pro­
vided by this chapter. 
242. See id.; ABA Report, supra note 35, at 1. 
243. See ALA. CODE § 29-2-161 (LexisNexis 2003). 
244. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL  CODE § 4903 (West 2011); VA. CODE  ANN. § 8.01­
195.10(B) (2007 & Supp. 2011); Innocence Project: Model Statute, supra note 35, 
§ 4(A)(2); see also supra note 66. 
245. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258D § 3 (2008); OHIO  REV. CODE  ANN. 
§ 2743.48(D) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011). 
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Section 5.  Wrongful Imprisonment–Cause of Action  [Judicial 
Relief] 
1. The state consents to be sued by a person who has been 
imprisoned where such imprisonment was wrongful, and to 
liability on its part because of that fact, only as provided in 
this chapter.  However, nothing in this chapter shall affect 
any liability of the state or of its employees to a wrongfully 
imprisoned individual on a claim for relief that is not based 
on the fact of wrongful imprisonment, including a claim for 
relief that arises out of circumstances occurring during the 
wrongfully imprisoned individual’s confinement in a state or 
local correctional institution.247 
2. A civil action may be brought against the state by an indi­
vidual who was wrongfully imprisoned if such individual sat­
isfies all of the eligibility requirements of section two and is 
not barred by any of the exclusions from eligibility in sec­
tion three.  In such action the individual may establish that 
he or she is a wrongfully imprisoned individual by (a) sub­
mitting a certified copy of the determination of the pardon 
and parole board or the governor that the offense for which 
the individual was imprisoned, including any lesser included 
offenses, was not committed by the individual; or (b) by 
submitting a certified copy of the entry of the judgment of a 
court of competent jurisdiction, determining that based on 
clear and convincing evidence the offense for which the in­
dividual was imprisoned, including any lesser included of­
fenses, was not committed by the individual, and that such 
charges or conviction and sentence shall be or has been re­
versed or dismissed, and that no further proceeding can or 
may be held against the individual based on any facts and 
circumstances alleged in the proceedings which resulted in 
the wrongful imprisonment.  No other evidence shall be re­
quired of the individual to establish that he or she is a 
wrongfully imprisoned individual, and the individual shall 
be irrebuttably presumed to be a wrongfully imprisoned 
individual.248 
3. In such action, if the court finds that the wrongfully impris­
oned individual has satisfied the requirements of subdivision 
two, the court shall award damages in such sum of money as 
247. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(F)(3). 
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2012] A PROPOSAL: COMPENSATION FOR WRONGFUL IMPRISONMENT 47 
the court determines will fairly and reasonably compensate 
such individual,249 including but not limited to: 
i. the amount of any fine, surcharge, other penalty or court 
costs imposed and paid, and any reasonable attorneys’ 
fees and other expenses incurred by the wrongfully im­
prisoned individual in connection with all associated 
criminal proceedings and appeals, if applicable, in con­
nection with obtaining the wrongfully imprisoned indi­
vidual’s discharge from confinement in a state or local 
correctional institution, and any fees and expenses in­
curred in connection with any civil actions and proceed­
ings for post-conviction relief which are related to the 
wrongful imprisonment;250 
ii. an amount to compensate the individual for each full 
year of imprisonment or a pro-rata amount for each part 
of a year so imprisoned, including, but not limited to, 
considering the individual’s physical and mental suffer­
ing,251 and taking into account the length and conditions 
under which the individual was imprisoned and any 
other factors deemed appropriate to compensate fairly 
the individual for such imprisonment,252 including prison 
labor and involuntary servitude; 
iii. any loss of wages, salary, or other earned income that 
directly resulted from the wrongfully imprisoned indi­
vidual’s arrest, prosecution, conviction, and wrongful 
imprisonment;253 
iv. any user’s fees or copayments recovered from such indi­
vidual for services rendered while in the custody of a 
correctional institution, including, but not limited to, 
medical care, housing, supervision, or any other ancillary 
services.254 
4. In awarding compensation under this section, a court shall 
not offset the award by any expenses incurred by the state 
or any political subdivision of the state in connection with 
the arrest, prosecution, and imprisonment of the individual, 
249. See N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(6) (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 2011); W. VA. 
CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a(g) (LexisNexis 2009). 
250. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 663A.1(6)(a) (West 1998); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2743.48(E)(2). 
251. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-108(a)(7)(A) (1999 & Supp. 2011). 
252. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258D § 5(A) (2008). 
253. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(E)(2)(c). 
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including, but not limited to, expenses for food, clothing, 
shelter, or medical care; nor shall the court offset the award 
by the value of the reduction in tuition or fees for educa­
tional services or the value of other services to be provided 
to the wrongfully imprisoned individual pursuant to this 
chapter.255 
5. In such civil action the wrongfully imprisoned individual 
shall be entitled to the assistance of counsel, and in addition 
to the award of monetary damages provided in section two, 
such individual shall also be entitled to reasonable attor­
neys’ fees.256 
6. A judgment or award of damages pursuant to this chapter 
may not include punitive or exemplary damages.257 
Alt. Section 5.  Wrongful Imprisonment–Proceeding for 
Compensation  [Administrative Relief] 
1. An individual who was wrongfully imprisoned may bring a 
proceeding before the board of claims [or appropriate ad­
ministrative body] if such individual satisfies all of the eligi­
bility requirements of section two of this chapter and is not 
excluded from eligibility by any of the provisions of section 
three of this chapter.  In such proceeding the individual may 
establish that he or she is a wrongfully imprisoned individ­
ual by (a) submitting a certified copy of the determination 
of the pardon and parole board or the governor that the 
offense for which the individual was convicted, sentenced 
and imprisoned, including any lesser included offenses, was 
not committed by the individual; or (b) by submitting a cer­
tified copy of the entry of a judgment of a court of compe­
tent jurisdiction, determining that based on clear and 
convincing evidence the offense for which the individual 
was wrongfully imprisoned, including any lesser included of­
fenses, was not committed by the individual, and that such 
charges or conviction and sentence has been dismissed or 
reversed, and that no further proceeding can or may be held 
255. See ALA. CODE § 29-2-160(d) (LexisNexis 2003); IOWA  CODE  ANN. 
§ 663A.1(7); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258D § 5(B). 
256. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-5(b) (West 2009).  The criteria for calculating 
attorneys’ fees may be found in subdivision 4 of Alt. Section 5. 
257. See D.C. CODE § 2-423 (LexisNexis 2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, 
§ 8242(3) (2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258D § 5(A); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, 
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against the individual based on any facts and circumstances 
alleged in the proceedings which resulted in the wrongful 
imprisonment.  No other evidence shall be required of the 
individual to establish that he or she is a wrongfully impris­
oned individual, and the individual shall be irrebuttably pre­
sumed to be a wrongfully imprisoned individual.258 
2. If the board of claims finds that the wrongfully imprisoned 
individual is eligible for relief and is not excluded from eligi­
bility, the board may award such sum of money as it deter­
mines will equitably259 compensate such individual, 
including but not limited to: 
i. the amount of any fine, surcharge, other penalty or court 
costs imposed and paid, and any reasonable attorneys’ 
fees and other expenses incurred by the wrongfully im­
prisoned individual in connection with all associated 
criminal proceedings and appeals, if applicable, in con­
nection with obtaining the wrongfully imprisoned indi­
vidual’s discharge from confinement in a state or local 
correctional institution, and any fees and expenses in­
curred in connection with any civil actions and proceed­
ings for post-conviction relief which are related to the 
wrongful imprisonment; 
ii. an amount to compensate the individual for each full 
year of imprisonment or a pro-rata amount for each part 
of a year so imprisoned, considering all the factors the 
board considers relevant, including, but not limited to, 
the individual’s physical and mental suffering,260 and 
taking into account the length and conditions under 
which the individual was imprisoned and any other fac­
tors deemed appropriate to fairly compensate the indi­
vidual for such imprisonment, including prison labor and 
involuntary servitude; 
iii. any loss of wages, salary, or other earned income that 
directly resulted from the wrongfully imprisoned indi­
vidual’s arrest, prosecution, conviction and wrongful 
imprisonment; 
iv. any user’s fees or copayments recovered from such indi­
vidual for services rendered while in the custody of a 
258. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(E)(1). 
259. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 775.05(4) (West 2009). 
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correctional institution, including, but not limited to 
medical care, housing, supervision or any other ancillary 
services. 
3. In awarding a sum of money under this section, the board 
shall not offset the award by any expenses incurred by the 
state or any political subdivision of the state in connection 
with the arrest, prosecution and imprisonment of the indi­
vidual, including, but not limited to, expenses for food, 
clothing, shelter or medical care; nor shall the court offset 
the award by the value of the reduction in tuition or fees for 
educational services or the value of other services to be pro­
vided to the wrongfully imprisoned individual pursuant to 
this chapter. 
4. In such proceeding the wrongfully imprisoned individual 
shall be entitled to the assistance of counsel, and in addition 
to the award of monetary damages provided in section two, 
such individual shall also be entitled to reasonable attor­
neys’ fees.  In determining the amount of allowable fees, the 
board of claims shall consider, among other things, the na­
ture, length, and complexity of the services performed, the 
usual and customary charge for work of like kind, and the 
benefits resulting to the wrongfully imprisoned individual as 
a result of the legal services performed.261  Attorney fees 
shall not be awarded to lawyers who have been compen­
sated for providing representation to the wrongfully impris­
oned individual. 
5. A judgment or award of damages pursuant to this chapter 
may not include punitive or exemplary damages.262 
Section 6.  Additional Relief 
1. The court [or the board of claims] may include as part of its 
determination an order requiring the state to provide the 
wrongfully imprisoned individual with any services that are 
reasonable and necessary to address any of the deficiencies 
in the individual’s physical and emotional condition that are 
shown to be directly related to the individual’s wrongful im­
prisonment through documentary or oral evidence submit­
ted to the court [or the board of claims] by the individual as 
261. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-B:18 (2007). 
262. See D.C. CODE § 2-423; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 8242(3); MASS. 
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part of his or her claim for compensation under this chapter, 
including, but not limited to, the nature of the services the 
individual seeks, and the agencies of the state from which 
the individual seeks or may seek to receive such services.263 
Any such agency so named in the claim shall receive reason­
able notice from the court [or the board of claims] of the 
proceedings pertaining to the possible ordering of such ser­
vices and shall be given an opportunity to be heard on 
whether such agency is the appropriate entity to provide 
such services if so ordered.264 
2. The court [or the board of claims] may also include in its 
determination an order entitling a wrongfully imprisoned in­
dividual to receive educational aid and services at state ex­
pense.  Aid under this section shall include expenses for 
tuition, fees, books, board and room at any state funded uni­
versity or college or any community college, and shall in­
clude assistance in meeting any admission standards or 
criteria required at such institutions, including, but not lim­
ited to, assistance in satisfying requirements for a certificate 
of equivalency of completion of secondary education and 
assistance in completing any adult education program or 
courses.265 
3. The privilege of receiving educational aid under subdivision 
two shall remain active for ten years after the release of the 
wrongfully imprisoned individual who qualifies for such aid, 
and such aid shall continue for up to a total of five years of 
aid within the ten year period or until the degree or pro­
gram for which the individual receives aid is completed, 
whichever is less, as long as the individual continues to 
make satisfactory progress in the course or program at­
tempted.  Aid shall be provided for completion of any de­
gree or program available at the institutions listed in 
subdivision two, at the individual’s choice.266 
4. If requested by the wrongfully convicted individual, the 
state department of mental health shall provide appropriate 
counseling to the individual at a mutually agreed-on loca­
tion at no charge to the individual.267 
263. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258D § 5(A). 
264. See id. 
265. See id; MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 53-1-214(1), (2) (2009). 
266. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-1-214(4). 
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5. If requested by the individual, the state shall pay the costs of 
job-skills training for one year.268 
6. The court [or the board of claims] may also include in its 
determination an order entitling a wrongfully imprisoned in­
dividual to receive child support payments owed by the 
claimant that became due, and interest on child support ar­
rearages that accrued, during the time served in prison but 
were not paid.269 
Section 7.  Methods of Payment; Eligibility of Estate to Receive 
Compensation 
1. The court [or the board of claims] in its discretion may di­
rect payment of compensation in lump sum, installments, or 
in annuity payments270 as it deems appropriate, but no part 
of such compensation shall be directed to any person other 
than the individual so pardoned or exonerated, nor shall the 
individual so pardoned or exonerated pay any part of the 
sum received to any persons for services rendered in con­
nection with its collection, provided, however, that this sec­
tion shall not preclude any contingent fee arrangement with 
counsel that is permitted under state law or local court 
rule.271  In determining whether to commute the compensa­
tion to a lump sum payment, the court [or the board of 
claims] shall consider whether there exists special needs 
warranting such payment, whether it will be in the best in­
terests of the individual and whether that individual has the 
ability to wisely manage and control the commuted award 
irrespective of whether there exist special needs.272 
2. Annuity payments, if granted, shall be based on a present 
value sum equal to the total amount of the award. The an­
nuity payments are payable in equal monthly installments 
for the life of the claimant and must be based on market 
interest rate per annum and other actuarial factors within 
the court’s [or the board of claims’] discretion.  The annuity 
payments may not be accelerated, deferred, increased, or 
268. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8(H)(2)(a) (Supp. 2011), amended by 
2011 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 262 (H.B. 285) (West). 
269. Innocence Project: Model Statute, supra note 35, § 4(B)(4). 
270. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 103.053. 
271. See ALA. CODE § 29-2-160 (LexisNexis 2003); MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. 
& PROC. §§ 10-501(c), (d)(1)(2) (LexisNexis 2009). 
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decreased.  The applicant may not sell, mortgage or other­
wise encumber, or anticipate the payments, wholly or partly, 
by assignment or otherwise.273 
3. In the event that the individual awarded compensation dies 
prior to receiving the full amount of his or her compensa­
tion, the individual’s estate shall be eligible to receive any 
remaining compensation.274 
4. Any right to apply for compensation under this chapter shall 
cease upon the death of the wrongfully imprisoned individ­
ual if the individual is not survived by any family members 
or domestic partners who were dependent upon the individ­
ual prior to the individual’s wrongful imprisonment, but if 
such individual has commenced a civil action or administra­
tive proceeding for compensation pursuant to section five of 
this chapter prior to his or her death, the estate of such indi­
vidual shall be eligible to receive said compensation.275  In 
the case of a posthumous exoneration of an innocent indi­
vidual, a family member [spouse, child, parent, sibling, or a 
domestic partner as defined by the laws of the jurisdiction in 
which the partner resided] of an innocent individual shall 
have the right to seek compensation under this section for 
the loss of financial support or companionship caused by the 
individual’s wrongful imprisonment. 
Section 8.  Statute of Limitations 
1. An action [or administrative proceeding] under this chapter 
shall be commenced within three years276 of service on a 
wrongfully imprisoned individual of a determination by the 
board of pardon and parole or by the governor that the of­
fense for which such individual was wrongfully imprisoned, 
including any lesser included offenses, was not committed 
by the individual; within three years of service on a wrong­
fully imprisoned individual of the entry of judgment of a 
court of competent jurisdiction determining that the offense 
for which the individual was wrongfully imprisoned, includ­
273. See  TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.053. 
274. See ALA. CODE § 29-2-160. 
275. See id. 
276. See § 29-2-162; IOWA  CODE  ANN. § 663A.1(8) (West 1998); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 258D § 8 (2008); N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(7) (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 2011); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(H) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. 
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ing any lesser included offenses, was not committed by the 
individual, and ordering that the charges or conviction and 
sentence of such individual be dismissed or reversed, and 
further ordering that no further proceedings can or may be 
held against the individual on any facts and circumstances 
alleged in the proceeding which had resulted in the convic­
tion;  an individual wrongfully imprisoned and released 
from custody prior to the effective date of this act shall com­
mence an action within five years of the effective date of 
this act.277 
2. The three-year period under this section shall toll if the indi­
vidual who was wrongfully imprisoned shows by clear and 
convincing evidence that he or she could not file suit under 
this Act due to health-related conditions, including mental 
disabilities, or other justifiable hardships. 
3. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, failure to file 
any applicable Notice of Claim shall not bar filing of a claim 
under this Act.278 
Section 9.  Notification of Right to Commence a Civil Action or 
Administrative Proceeding 
1. When a court [or pardon authority] determines that an indi­
vidual is a wrongfully imprisoned individual or issues a dec­
laration of actual innocence pursuant to section 10, the 
court [or pardon authority] shall provide the individual with 
a copy of this statute and orally inform the individual and 
his or her attorney of the individual’s rights under this stat­
ute to commence a civil action against the state in the courts 
[or administrative agency] of this state because of the indi­
vidual’s wrongful imprisonment and to be represented in a 
civil action [or administrative proceeding] by counsel of the 
individual’s own choice. 
2. The court 	[or pardon authority] described in subdivision 
one shall notify the clerk of the court in which a civil action 
may be commenced [or the administrative agency], in writ­
ing, within seven days of the entry of its determination, that 
the individual is a wrongfully imprisoned individual, of the 
name and proposed mailing address of the individual, and of 
the fact that the person has the rights to commence a civil 
277. See Innocence Project: Model Statute, supra note 35, § 6. 






      05/09/2012   13:22:53
31827-wne_34-1 Sheet No. 32 Side A      05/09/2012   13:22:53
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\34-1\WNE101.txt unknown Seq: 55  9-MAY-12 10:14
 
2012] A PROPOSAL: COMPENSATION FOR WRONGFUL IMPRISONMENT 55 
action [or administrative proceeding] and to have legal rep­
resentation as provided in this section. The clerk of the 
court in which a civil action may be commenced [or the ad­
ministrative agency] shall maintain in the clerk’s office [or 
agency’s office] a list of wrongfully imprisoned individuals 
for whom notices are received under this section and shall 
create files in the clerk’s office [or the agency’s office] for 
each such individual.279 
Section 10.  Issuance of Declaration of Actual Innocence 
1. A wrongfully imprisoned individual whose conviction has 
been reversed or vacated, or against whom charges have 
been dismissed, on grounds other than actual innocence 
may petition a court of competent jurisdiction for a declara­
tion of actual innocence.  The petition shall be heard by a 
civil or criminal court in the judicial district in which the 
individual was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment. 
The petition shall contain all of the relevant allegations of 
fact known to the petitioner at the time of filing, including 
all relevant documents and test results, and shall enumerate 
and include all relevant previous records, applications, peti­
tions, appeals, and their dispositions.  A copy of the petition 
shall be served on the prosecuting attorney who prosecuted 
the individual’s criminal case, and such prosecuting attor­
ney, if available, shall appear on behalf of the state. 
2. Upon consideration of the petition and the response by the 
state, the previous records in the case, and the record of any 
hearing held by the court in connection with the petition, 
the court may either summarily dismiss the petition for fail­
ure to state a claim or assert grounds upon which relief shall 
be granted; or upon a finding that the petitioner has, based 
on petition submitted under the preceding subsection, 
proven by clear and convincing evidence that the offense for 
which the individual was wrongfully imprisoned, including 
any such lesser included offenses, was not committed by the 
individual, the court may issue a declaration of actual inno­
cence as a judgment of the court.  Such declaration and 
judgment shall satisfy the requirements of section five of 
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this Act with respect to the filing of an action or proceeding 
for compensation.280 
Section 11.  Right of Appeal 
Any party is entitled to the rights of appeal afforded parties in 
a civil action following a decision on such motions as set forth in 
section [XX] of said Chapter [XXX] of the [State] code. 
CONCLUSION 
Society is morally obligated to financially compensate and pro­
vide services to those who were wrongfully imprisoned. The system 
must compensate those who have fallen victim to its inadequacies. 
This article suggests that states without compensation statutes 
adopt the proposed recommended statute.  Since the proposed stat­
ute takes provisions from statutes currently in use, it provides a 
common and workable approach to provide just and fair compensa­
tion to the exonerees.  Although a legislature might fine-tune the 
requirements, the recommended statute in this article offers a pre­
liminary framework for a state that does not currently have a stat­
ute to compensate the wrongfully imprisoned. 
280. See generally VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-327.10-13 (2008). 
